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EMPIRICAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AS SCIENTIFIC
DIALOGUE
GREGORY MITCHELL*
This Essay considers how the scientific status of empirical legal
scholarship might be enhanced. The leading proposal for making
empirical legal research more scientific is to move to a system of peer
review for research reports. Although a move to pre-publication peer
review might well improve the quality of empirical legal research, the
probability of a widespread adoption of peer review by law reviews is
low. A more feasible reform is for law reviews to adopt a set of
stringent disclosure requirements designed to foster critical review and
replication of empirical legal research. Adherence to such disclosure
rules would increase the objectivity of empirical legal research by
forcing researchers to commit publicly to definite empirical
propositions in reproducible terms and would facilitate the systematic
accumulation of knowledge about legal phenomena using meta-
analysis.
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and which smack of the delusional?'
We portray peer review to the public as a quasi-sacred process that
helps to make science our most objective truth teller. But we know
that the system of peer review is biased, unjust, unaccountable,
incomplete, easily fixed, often insulting, usually ignorant,
occasionally foolish, and frequently wrong.2
[O]bjectivity is what makes science believable and is in part what is
scientific about science.'
INTRODUCTION
A prominent, if not yet consensus, view within the legal academy is
that legal scholars should produce more empirical research.4 Richard
Posner, for instance, recommends that the "legal professoriat redirect its
research and teaching efforts toward fuller participation in the enterprise of
social science,"5 and Michael Heise contends that "[o]ur legal literature
would be enriched if more academics, particularly law professors, became
more engaged in empirical legal research and produced more of it."
6
Likewise, Deborah Rhode recommends that legal institutions "increase
support for empirical and interdisciplinary research" as part of a
commitment to "improving the quality and impact of academic work,"7
while Thomas Ulen holds out hope that the study of the law will become
more scientific, with empirical work being "an absolutely vital part of the
development of a mature legal science."' As if heeding this call for greater
1. Robert A. Weinberg, Of Clowns and Clones, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2002, at 55.
2. Richard Horton, Editorial, Genetically Modified Food: Consternation, Confusion, and
Crack-up, 172 MED. J. AUSTL. 148, 149 (2000).
3. Peter Kosso, Science and Objectivity, 86 J. PHIL. 245, 256 (1989).
4. Compare Dennis Patterson, The Limits of Empiricism: Facts Tell Us, 98 MICH. L. REV.
2738, 2738 (2000) ("The conventional legal academic wisdom about empiricism is that empirical
information is by-and-large a good thing, that we need more of it, and that empirical analysis is
preferable to many scholarly alternatives now on offer in the law review literature." (footnote
omitted)), with William M. Landes, The Empirical Side of Law and Economics, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 167, 180 (2003) (suggesting that "most law professors regard empirical work as a form of
drudgery not worthy of first-class minds," which "translates into a downward shift in the demand
for empirical relative to theoretical scholarship"). See also Elizabeth Warren, The Market for
Data: The Changing Role of Social Sciences in Shaping the Law, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 1, 2 n.2
(citing several works over the last decade calling for more empirical legal research).
5. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 164 (1999).
6. Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 834 (1999).
7. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1357-58 (2002).
8. Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the
Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 900. See also Rachel Croson,
Why and How to Experiment: Methodologies from Experimental Economics, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 921, 945 ("[Mlore [legal experiments] should be used in the future. Experiments are an
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empiricism, each new law review issue seems to bring yet another report of
original empirical research.9
At the same time, serious concerns exist regarding the quality of
empirical legal research. Most notable in this respect is the critique
recently offered by Lee Epstein and Gary King, who opine that "the current
important addition to the researcher's toolbox that can help to achieve our goal of better
understanding and explaining our world.").
9. Student-edited law reviews now regularly publish original empirical research on topics
of legal interest, and the frequency of publication of such research in law reviews seems to be
increasing. See Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study, 29 J. LEG.
STUD. 517, 528-29 (2000) (providing data on law review articles from 1982 to 1996 that "hint
that law professors and students have become more inclined to produce (although not consume)
quantitative analyses"); Heise, supra note 6, at 812 (observing that "[a]lthough empirical legal
scholarship remains the overwhelming exception to a general rule favoring non-empirical
research" the role of empirical legal has grown, although somewhat haltingly, in the past decade);
Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision
Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 825 [hereinafter Heise, New
Empiricism] ("Traditional law reviews are beginning to publish more empirical work, despite
editors who are frequently just a few years removed from college and typically lack any advanced
graduate-level training."); cf Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1314, 1316-17 (2002) (noting the growth in interdisciplinary legal research since the late 1960s).
An even cursory review of recent law review issues will reveal the current popularity of
empirical approaches to legal questions. See, e.g., Helen M. Bowers, Fairness Opinions and the
Business Judgment Rule: An Empirical Investigation of Target Firms' Use of Fairness Opinions,
96 Nw. U. L. REV. 567, 568 (2002) (using empirical research to cast doubt on "widely held
perceptions concerning the use of fairness opinions"); Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys
Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1719, 1720 (2002) (using empirical evidence to show the benefit of having counsel at
pretrial bail hearings); Richard L. Cupp Jr. & Danielle Pollage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products
Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 874 (2002) (using
empirical research to show that negligence jury instructions favor plaintiffs more than products
liability instructions); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An
Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743 (2002) (comparing judges and juries based on
empirical evidence of the rate of punitive damages awards and the relation to compensatory
damage awards for both groups); Barry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey, Electing the Supreme
Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123, 125 (2003) (employing empirical analysis to relate the ideological
distance between the Supreme Court and Congress to the Court's propensity to strike down
legislation); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, Ill YALE L.J.
1935, 1939 (2002) (examining the relationship between human rights treaties and human rights
practices); Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and Its
Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239, 244 (2003) (using statistical analyses to explore the use of
clemency); Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille, When is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative
Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L.
REV. 143, 143 (2002) (presenting empirical research on cost-shifting provisions in mandatory
arbitration agreements for employment claims); Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason:
An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel and Belton, 2002 WISC. L. REV. 657, 697 (using
empirical analysis to question the application of Chimel and Belton); Daniel M. Schneider,
Assessing and Predicting Who Wins Federal Tax Trial Decisions, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 473,
473 (2002) (analyzing the relationship between the social background of judges and the outcomes
of federal tax trial decisions); Albert Yoon, Love's Labor Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal
Court Judges: 1945-2000, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (2003) (showing that tenure trends for
federal district and circuit judges remained stable from 1945 through 2000).
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state of empirical legal scholarship is deeply flawed."' After examining
over 300 works of empirical legal scholarship," these experts in research
methodology concluded that "serious problems of inference and
methodology abound everywhere we find empirical research in the law
reviews and in articles written by members of the legal community."12 If
10. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002).
Rhode asserts that "[t]he problem is not only the inadequate quantity of empirical work, but also
the inadequate quality. Research by law students and professors with no formal training in social
science methodology provides constant reminders of the limitations of armchair empiricism."
Rhode, supra note 7, at 1343. Some of the most common problems include "[siloppy survey
techniques, skewed samples, and sweeping generalizations from unrepresentative findings." Id.
See also Gerald N. Rosenberg, Across the Great Divide (Between Law and Political Science), 3
GREEN BAG 2D 267, 268 (2000) ("[F]or the most part, [legal academics] lack the training to be
contributors to empirical political science scholarship about law and courts." (footnote omitted));
David E. Van Zandt, Discipline-Based Faculty, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 332, 332 (2003)
("Unfortunately, because of both their training and the lack of strong norms of peer review, the
work of many law school faculty falls short of the standards that prevail in other disciplines.").
Cf. Mark A. Graber, Law and Sports Officiating: A Misunderstood and Justly Neglected
Relationship, 16 CONST. COMM. 293, 304 (1999) ("Given the law review preference for bold
theses and the tendency for other academic disciplines to recognize shades of grey, the quality of
the non-legal scholarship in an essay submitted to a law review may have little or even an inverse
relationship to the probability of a publication offer.").
Epstein and King's article elicited charged responses from legal scholars, several of
whom agreed that empirical legal research could be improved but disagreed about the extent or
details of the problem. See Frank Cross, Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Above the Rules: A
Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 135 (2002) ("Epstein and King devote the
bulk of their article to an unremitting and excessive attack on the current state of empirical legal
research methodology. Although some of their attacks are well aimed, on too many occasions
their shots miss the targets they seek."); Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical
Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 153 (2002) ("At some level of
generality, it is hard to disagree with the spirit of Epstein and King's complaints .... We
nonetheless reject much of Epstein and King's indictment of legal scholarship."); Richard L.
Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169, 188 (2002)
(acknowledging that some of Epstein and King's criticisms are correct but adding that "empirical
legal scholarship has a great deal to contribute to the understanding of law and legal institutions,
and social scientists would benefit from paying close attention to the methodological innovations
performed by legal scholars").
11. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, A Reply, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 191, 199 (2002) (discussing
how they selected "three-hundred-plus articles" for consideration).
12. Epstein & King, supra note 10, at 15. As to the expert status of Epstein and King, both
are professors of political science who have published original empirical research as well as work
on research methodology. See generally GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY:
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994) (developing a unified approach to
valid descriptive and causal inference for qualitative research); Lee Epstein et al., Do Political
Preferences Change? A Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 60 J. POL. 801
(1998) (tracking the Justices' political preferences according to their conference voting records);
Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66 (2000)
(employing a new method for measuring issue salience).
Concerns exist about doctrinal scholarship, as well. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 7, at
1340 ("Yet too much conventional legal analysis is not done well. It exhaustively exhumes
unimportant topics or replicates familiar arguments on important ones. Too little effort is made to
connect law to life by assessing the real world consequences of analytic frameworks.").
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Epstein, King, and other critics of empirical legal research are right, then
legal scholars should focus on producing better empirical research and not
simply more of it.'3
Much of this ostensible quality problem is said to arise from the fact
that student-edited law reviews serve as the primary outlet for empirical
legal research: if experts, rather than law students, selected manuscripts for
publication and suggested needed revisions, then surely the quality of
empirical legal research would improve. 14 Epstein and King accordingly
13. Epstein and King offer a wide-ranging critique of empirical legal research as a collective
body of work. More common are criticisms directed at particular empirical studies. See
generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14
EUR. J. INT'L L. 171 (2003) (commenting on Hathaway, supra note 9); Oona A. Hathaway,
Testing Conventional Wisdom, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 185 (2003) (responding to the Goodman and
Jinks critique); Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damages Awards: Failure of a
Social Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867 (1999) (commenting on Reid Hastie &
W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40
ARIz. L. REV. 901 (1998)); Robert J. MacCoun, The Costs and Benefits of Letting Juries Punish
Corporations: Comment on Viscusi, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1821 (2000) (commenting on W. Kip
Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547 (2000)).
14. See, e.g., Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Roman Law: A Case Study in the Hazards of
Legal Scholarship, 31 GA. J. INT'L COMP. L. 33, 56-57 (2002) (discussing how faculty
involvement in the law review article selection process could help to avoid author errors); Arthur
D. Austin, The "Custom of Vetting" as a Substitute for Peer Review, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 4-5
(1990) ("Academics had to fess up to a more ignominious scandal; there is no peer review system
for the articles that law professors publish in law reviews. As a consequence, their articles do not
receive objective and qualified criticism-and respectability."); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Medical
Malpractice: Research and Reform, 79 VA. L. REV. 2155, 2186 n.135 (1993) ("Relying on legal
scholarship for secondary empirical data is especially troublesome because legal publications
typically lack relevant peer review. Most law journals are good about requiring proof that cited
material exists, but they are not as good about clarifying its value for readers."); Roger C.
Cramton, "The Most Remarkable Institution ": The American Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1,
9 (1986) (arguing that law reviews are less timely and of a lower quality because of the "lack of
continuity resulting from the annual turnover of editors, falloff in interest of third-year editors
who are not elected to officer positions, limited scholarly perspective, and inexperience in legal
research, writing, and editing"); Heise, supra note 6, at 814 n.39 ("Almost all academics, as well
as a surprisingly large number of law professors, find the absence of blind peer-review at most
law reviews, certainly the student-edited ones, almost scandalous."); Posner, supra note 9, at
1324 ("Doctrinal scholarship may have been (may be) dull and limited, but it is useful and it is
conducted under conditions that ensure minimum quality. Those conditions-a large professional
audience; a common academic culture; continuity with teaching, judging, and performance as a
student; and law review editing-are missing from interdisciplinary legal scholarship ....");
Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1136
(1995) ("[L]aw review editors generally lack the competence to select and improve [nondoctrinal]
scholarship."); David A. Rier, The Future of Legal Scholarship and Scholarly Communication:
Publication in the Age of Cyberspace, 30 AKRON L. REV. 183, 210-11 (1996) (arguing for
"greater reliance on faculty reviewers and editors" as part of an effort to "improve the value of
legal scholarship to its readers"); Van Zandt, supra note 10, at 339 ("[E]ven placement in one of
the very top student-edited journals is suspect; the quality of articles in those journals varies much
more than it does in the top peer-reviewed journals of other disciplines.").
Epstein and King summarize well the concerns about lack of peer review:
A third sign [of indifference to research as a social enterprise] is the legal
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propose a modified system of editorial peer review for law reviews in
which "the law review would publish only articles that have (1) been
reviewed by at least one external expert in a double blind (or at least single
blind) peer-review setting and (2) attained the approval of the Uournal's]
editorial board."'5  Such a system would presumably "filter out at least
some of the 'junk' law professors themselves accuse their own journals of
publishing" and improve the status of the law schools whose scholarship
model is seen by other branches of academia as "intellectually
impoverished."' 6
While this proposal probably holds intuitive appeal for many non-
legal scholars who publish in peer-reviewed journals, Epstein and King
offer little empirical support for the proposition that pre-publication expert
review improves the quality of empirical scholarship. 7 And as it turns out,
community's refusal to subject articles submitted to some of its most prestigious outlets
to any form of blind peer review, preferring instead to leave the refereeing task to law
students. Most scholars in units outside of law schools are, when they hear of it,
astonished at this organizational decision. For they have come to learn that while it is
easy to fool oneself (or law students, as the case might be) into believing that one has
produced an important research result, it is a good deal more difficult to 'fool,' however
inadvertently, a community of experts spending their lives working on related problems.
Epstein & King, supra note 10, at 48 (footnote omitted).
Without some form of blind reviewing, separating the person from the product is
difficult. Also problematic is that students (and indeed any one person) may lack the
expertise necessary to evaluate the submissions that cover complex and technical areas of
the law or employ sophisticated statistical or qualitative methods. Finally, the lack of
blind peer review in most law journals puts legal academics at a distinct disadvantage
vis-a-vis the rest of the university.
... [T]he lack of peer review (among other features of this "unique" system) makes
it difficult for scholars in other units to take legal work seriously-especially since their
colleagues do not "count" non-peer-reviewed articles when it comes time for tenure,
promotions, salary raises, and other perks. That others do not take legal research
seriously is, of course, not our point; what is central is that peer review has, at times,
important benefits.
Id. at 125-26.
15. Epstein & King, supra note 10, at 128. Posner has similarly recommended that law
reviews "focus on doctrinal scholarship" and "give serious consideration to having every
plausible submission of a nondoctrinal piece refereed anonymously by one or preferably two
scholars who specialize in the field to which the submission purports to contribute." Posner,
supra note 14, at 1136. See also Rhode, supra note 7, at 1360 (recommending that law schools
"support more specialized peer-refereed reviews").
16. Epstein & King, supra note 10, at 130.
17. See Cross et al., supra note 10, at 147-48 ("Epstein and King certainly have not
established the necessary inferences to support their proposal, and they ignore the considerable
literature criticizing aspects of the peer-review process. Indeed, the peer-review process itself
looks insupportable by the very rules of inference established by Epstein and King." (footnote
omitted)). In a later article, Epstein and King make clear that their proposals for reform to
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the evidence on this point is less than definitive, leading some legal
scholars to express skepticism about the utility of peer review.18
empirical legal scholarship, including the adoption of peer review, are based on supposition rather
than testing:
[Tihese recommendations are based only on our hypothesis that implementing them
would improve empirical analyses in the law. We obviously are not certain that any of
our ideas will work as intended at any particular law school, and we have conducted no
analyses to evaluate them. Such studies surely should be done. At the same time, our
experience in other disciplines suggests support for the general direction of these
proposals.
Lee Epstein & Gary King, Building an Infrastructure for Empirical Research in the Law, 53 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 311, 312 (2003). Elsewhere, I imply that peer review improves empirical research
without discussing how that might be so. See Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too
Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1907, 1929-31 (2002). This Essay seeks to correct my earlier oversight on this
point.
18. See Frank B. Cross, The Naive Environmentalist, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 477, 486
(2002) ("Peer review is demonstrably unreliable at screening research for validity. It tends to be
infected by ideological biases and replicate the preferences of the editor and reviewers. Simply
because something is peer-reviewed does not make it true, nor does the absence of peer review
make information false." (footnotes omitted)); Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing the
Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 615, 666 (1996) (arguing that faculty
editing is an "inherently conservative force" because the process of peer review and selection will
lead to the publication of pieces that fit into "generally accepted norms and conform with the
ordinary style expectations of editors and especially peer reviewers"); Bernard J. Hibbitts,
Yesterday Once More: Skeptics, Scribes and the Demise of Law Reviews, 30 AKRON L. REV.
267, 292-93 (1996) (arguing that because of "many well-documented shortcomings: poorly- or
arbitrarily-selected reviewers; reviewer anonymity, partiality, fallibility, or overwork; a
systematic bias against innovation; lengthy delays; unavailability of reviews to general readers;
and even occasional editorial dismissal of peer verdicts," quality control through peer review may
not be much better than quality control by students (footnotes omitted)); Lars Noah, Medicine's
Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community,
44 ARIz. L. REV. 373, 397 (2002) ("As in other scientific disciplines, editorial peer review has
long served an important quality control function in biomedical publications. It has a number of
shortcomings, however, that may limit its utility as a mechanism for validating the information
that appears in print." (footnotes omitted)); Effie Chan, Note, The "Brave New World" of
Daubert: True Peer Review, Editorial Peer Review, and Scientific Validity, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
100, 129 (1995) ("[E]ditorial peer review practices in place at different scientific journals are so
unregulated and widely disparate that editorial peer review cannot be viewed as a monolithic
indicator of scientific validity. The quality of editorial peer review at any journal depends largely
on the individuals who referee its articles.").
I do not hold the view that the costs of peer review outweigh its benefits. In fact, I share
the view of Ann Weller, who conducted the most comprehensive review of the empirical
evidence on peer review to date and concluded that "editorial peer review is messy and does not
always work as it should, but it is essential to the integrity of scientific and scholarly
communication." ANN C. WELLER, EDITORIAL PEER REVIEW: ITS STRENGTHS AND
WEAKNESSES 322 (2001). This view is reflected in an editorial by Drummond Rennie, Deputy
Editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association.
Once again, in this issue of The Journal, we publish studies that fail to show any dramatic
effect, let alone improvement, brought about by peer review. Yet, despite this, it
continues to be the experience of editors that peer review is extraordinarily effective,
sometimes in saving the reputations of the authors. Why? It makes good sense that
20041
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Furthermore, the likelihood that law reviews will move to some form of
editorial peer review any time soon seems slight at best."9
If we grant the importance of gaining knowledge about the legal
system through empirical research but also grant the importance of doing
sound empirical legal research so that we gain reliable knowledge, 0 two
editors would want to enlist the services of those more expert in a particular subject than
themselves. And there are powerful reasons why editors might wish to spread the
responsibility for unfavorable decisions about manuscripts. But there is another
important factor. Peer review represents a crucial democratization of the editorial
process, incorporating and educating large numbers of the scientific community, and
lessening the impression that editorial decisions are arbitrary.
Drummond Rennie, Fourth Internal Congress on Peer Review in Biomedical Publication, 287
JAMA 2759, 2759 (2002) (footnotes omitted). Any publication biases associated with a peer-
review system are not likely to be worse than publication biases already present within legal
scholarship. Moreover, any delays or reductions in the publication of empirical legal research
caused by pre-publication expert review may actually benefit rather than harm the larger system
of legal scholarship, particularly given the applied nature of much empirical legal research, by
allowing time for additional and better evidence to accumulate. Nevertheless, I recognize that
reasonable people can disagree about the costs and benefits of peer review and that there is great
resistance to the adoption of a system of peer review for empirical legal scholarship published in
law reviews. Hence, the proposal advanced below is a second-best approach to improving
empirical legal scholarship in light of the infeasibility of a move to peer review.
19. Perhaps the best evidence of the improbability of near-term reforms that will diminish
student control over the editorial and selection process is the lack of any movement in that
direction over the years despite the numerous calls for greater faculty control. For instance,
Roger Cramton's dire prediction, in 1986, about the "doubtful future of the student-edited
review" in the face of growing competition from faculty-edited reviews, Cramton, supra note 14,
at 10, remains unfulfilled almost twenty years later.
Epstein and King recognize that "switching wholesale to the full blind-peer-review
model ... is infeasible," Epstein & King, supra note 17, at 317, and Dean Spitzer summarizes
well the difficulties in moving toward even the modified form of peer review that Epstein and
King advocate:
There would be significant costs in making such a transition. The most obvious is the
time and effort involved in any significant institutional innovation. Less obvious are the
possible political costs. The law reviews are regarded as belonging to the students. A
dean who tried to persuade the existing editorial board to agree to such a transformation
would risk being perceived as unfriendly to student rights. There are enough flash points
with students without trying to transform the law review. I would need to be convinced
that the benefits from making the transformation were larger and more certain before I
would risk the costs.
Matthew Spitzer, Evaluating Valuing Empiricism (at Law Schools), 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 328, 330
(2003) (footnote omitted). Moreover, there is evidence of a high degree of support for the
student-run law review system among judges, practicing lawyers, and even faculty. See Max
Stier et al., Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A Survey of Attorneys,
Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1467, 1504 (1992) ("Our results suggest that radical
change is neither necessary nor desired: Student selection and editing of law review articles are
quite popular among all segments of the legal community, and the members of that community
find the selected articles themselves to be useful.").
20. See, e.g., Julius G. Getman, Contributions of Empirical Data to Legal Research, 35 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 489, 489 (1985) ("Empirical study has the potential to illuminate the workings of
the legal system, to reveal its shortcomings, problems, successes, and illusions, in a way that no
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questions arise. First, are advocates of peer review, including a majority of
the U.S. Supreme Court,2' justified in their belief that peer review is a key
ingredient in good empirical research, or are law professors who publish
empirical resehrch in student-edited law reviews justified in their relative
lack of concern about peer review? Second, if peer review does confer
some benefits on empirical research, are there other, more feasible ways to
provide similar benefits to the system of empirical legal scholarship?
I argue here that peer review is an important ingredient in good
empirical research, but not (only) because peer review serves some quality-
checking function, which is the function so often emphasized in discussions
of peer review.22 Rather, I argue that the primary benefit of peer review
lies in its objectivity-forcing function: peer review compels the disclosure
of important information about empirical research using a common
methodological language so that the research may be subjected to critical
scrutiny.23 Thus, while peer review may directly improve the quality of
amount of library research or subtle thinking can match."); Russell Korobkin, Empirical
Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilities and Pitralls, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1033, 1055
("Empirical research will usually fail to reach a definitive conclusion, but it can make a valuable
contribution to scholarly knowledge by pointing in the direction of a certain conclusion, even if it
must rely on future studies to further develop the thesis and push it toward a conclusive set of
results."); Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role of
Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 HOuS. L. REV. 667, 691-92 (2002)
(advocating "cautious obeisance" in applying empirical research to patent law, despite the fact
that it "can lead to decisionmaking that is more reflective of facts on the ground"); Rachael N.
Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 656-57 (1988) (asserting that courts abdicate their duty to safeguard
fundamental constitutional rights "[w]hen justice is blind to the fruits of scientific and social
scientific research").
21. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) ("The fact of
publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not
dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or
methodology on which an [expert) opinion is premised."). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Stevens did not join that part of the majority opinion in Daubert that embraced peer review as one
the factors to consider in assessing the scientific validity of expert testimony. See id. at 598-601.
22. That is, peer review is often seen as a way to eliminate errors in research design, data
analysis, and the inferences from data. See, e.g., JOHN ZIMAN, REAL SCIENCE: WHAT IT IS, AND
WHAT IT MEANS 42 (2000) ("Peer review of contributions to the primary research literature is the
principal social mechanism for quality control in academic science." (footnote omitted)); Ikka
Niiniluoto, Measuring the Success of Science, 1 PSA: PROC. BIENNIAL MEETING PHIL. SCI.
ASS'N. 435, 436 (1990) ("The best method of 'quality control' in science is still peer review in its
different variants (referees of journals, expert assessment in academic appointments, evaluation
groups, etc.).").
23. Cf. M.J. Peterson, Community and Individual Stakes in the Collection, Analysis, and
Availability of Data, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 462, 462 (1995) ("The peer review process, the
community's main mechanism for encouraging quality work, cannot operate unless researchers
explain their procedures of data collection and analysis in detail sufficient for others to
understand how the project was carried out or even duplicate it from scratch for themselves.").
Viewed from this perspective, peer review serves an information-forcing function of a special
kind: the information must be disclosed in a common statistical and methodological language
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empirical research by catching some errors in research design and data
analysis, peer review should be viewed most fundamentally as a
mechanism for the enforcement of scientific norms and conventions
designed to foster publicity and transparency in methodA and results,
replication and extension of research findings, and critical review in
general. By forcing research to be amenable to intersubjective testing and
review, peer review confers (a form of) objectivity on empirical research,
and it is this objectivity that lends special credence to scientifically
produced knowledge.24 From this perspective, objectivity is a necessary
condition for science, and peer review is a sufficient, but not a necessary,
condition for objectivity.25
Viewing peer review as primarily a means to objectivity rather than as
a guarantor of authenticity or verity in research findings suggests an
alternative approach to improving empirical legal scholarship that may be
more feasible than a move to peer review: law reviews can force
objectivity into empirical legal scholarship by adopting a set of stringent
disclosure requirements for reports of original empirical research, including
disclosure of detailed information about methodology, data analysis, and
the availability of raw data for replication and review.26 Adherence to such
disclosure norms would make empirical legal research more amenable to
intersubjective review and testing and would go far toward making this
body of research a more objective, respected, and productive form of
that is most useful to other scientists.
24. See, e.g., DAVID L. HULL, SCIENCE AS A PROCESS 347 (1988) ("To count as scientific, a
finding must be replicable."); Alvin I. Goldman, Science, Publicity, and Consciousness, 64 PHIL.
Sci. 525, 525 (1997) ("An old but enduring idea is that science is a fundamentally 'public' or
'intersubjective' enterprise. According to this thesis, the core of scientific methodology is
interpersonal rather than private."); Olaf Helmer & Nicholas Rescher, On the Epistemology of the
Inexact Sciences, 6 MGMT. SCI. 25, 27 (1959) ("[I]t is objectivity, i.e., the intersubjectivity of
findings independent of any one person's intuitive judgment, which distinguishes science from
intuitive guesswork however brilliant."); Peter Railton, Marx and Objectivity of Science, 2 PSA:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE BIENNIAL MEETING OF THE PHIL. OF SCI. ASS'N 813, 815 (1984)
("[O]bjective inquiry uses procedures that are intersubjective, and independent of particular
individuals or circumstances-e.g., its experiments are reproducible, its methods are determinate,
its criteria are effective, and it makes no essential use of introspective or subjectively privileged
evidence in theory assessment."). I discuss in more detail below objectivity and its relation to
science and scientific progress, and I argue that adherence to publicity and transparency in
research leads cumulatively to more accurate and reliable knowledge and is what separates
scientific from pseudoscientific inquiry. See infra Part I.A.
25. Treating peer review, in all its practiced forms, as sufficient for objectivity in empirical
research overstates the case. A better view would be to label peer review, if well done, as a
sufficient condition for objectivity.
26. The proposed disclosure requirements would be modeled after publication rules for
psychological research and replication rules within political science and would be codified in THE
BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 17th
ed. 2000) [hereinafter THE BLUEBOOK]. For details, see infra Part I.
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scientific dialogue.27  The prospects for this alternative proposal seem
greater than the prospects for imposition of peer review because this
alternative would not require the surrender of student control over the law
review or the recruitment of numerous experts to perform article reviews.28
27. In proposing that law review editors impose stringent disclosure requirements on
empirical works, this Essay turns on its head the complaint that law review editors edit with too
heavy a hand, by arguing that law review editors' considerable attention to detail may be used to
improve reports of empirical legal research. This Essay seeks to provide law review editors with
guidelines that can be used to ensure that proper disclosures are made, or, at the least, can help
editors to decide whether to take on the task of publishing a report of empirical research. For
examples of law professors' complaints about the editorial practices of law reviews, particularly
with respect to style edits, see Afton Dekanal, Faculty-Edited Law Reviews: Should the Law
Schools Join the Rest of Academe?, 57 UMKC L. REV. 233, 236 (1989) ("For many-and
probably most-journals, over-editing has become the order of the day, and the practice does not
seem to be abating."); James Lindgren, Reforming the American Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1123, 1128 (1995) ("It isn't unusual for editors to try to rewrite almost every sentence."); Carol
Sanger, Editing, 82 GEO. L.J. 513, 513 (1993) ("At its best, law review editing, like editing
elsewhere in the academic and literary worlds, results in a piece improved in style, structure, and
content. Too often, however, law review articles are not so much improved as simply changed,
sometimes hundreds of times within a single manuscript."); Reinhard Zimmerman, Law Reviews:
A Foray Through a Strange World, 47 EMORY L.J. 659, 676 (1998) ("From the perspective of an
author, particularly a European author, the process of editing is, as a rule, uncommonly
annoying."); Laura F. Rothstein & Mark A. Rothstein, Law Reviews Suffer from Lack of Peer
Review, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 6, 1986, at 10 ("Zealous students have a tendency to over-edit
articles, rewriting the authored articles in their own styles for no real reason.").
Lawrence Friedman asserts that all of this editing is for naught:
Law review editors are supposed to enforce tight, concise writing. But in fact, legal
scholarship suffers enormously from bloat. Very few articles are tightly written. They
might have tight sentences, but the piece itself goes on and on. And on. Many articles
have a kind of hopeless obesity.
Lawrence M. Friedman, Law Reviews and Legal Scholarship: Some Comments, 75 DEN. U. L.
REV. 661, 663 (1998). The proposal advanced in this Essay, if implemented, should lead to
measurable improvements in the depth and breadth of information disclosed about empirical legal
research. Thus, while the length of empirical articles might increase under this proposal, the hope
is that such lengthening would be seen as a healthful rather than pointless gain.
28. Most of what I say here is consistent with the recommendations of Epstein and King,
who also advocate better disclosure in empirical legal scholarship and the public availability of
data for replication. They maintain that "[g]ood empirical work adheres to the replication
standard: another researcher should be able to understand, evaluate, build on, and reproduce the
research without any additional information from the author." Epstein & King, supra note 10, at
38. However, this rule does not actually require anyone to replicate the results reported in an
article or book. Rather, "it only requires that researchers provide information-in the article or
book or in some other publicly available or accessible form-sufficient to replicate the results in
principle." Id. (footnote omitted). See also Epstein & King, supra note 17, at 319 ("We
recommend that law reviews, at a minimum, require documentation of empirical data with as
much specificity as they do for textual documentation .... This means simply making it possible
for any reader to traverse the chain of empirical evidence amassed to support the conclusions
published."). The goal here is to further discuss and justify the need for better disclosure in
empirical legal scholarship and to come up with a more immediate, more feasible means to this
end than the primary vehicle proposed by Epstein and King, a move to a modified system of peer
review.
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In addition to its greater feasibility than peer review, the proposal
advanced here has other attractive features. First and foremost, the
propagation of strict disclosure requirements may indirectly improve the
quality of empirical legal research. Because the disclosure requirements
would direct the researcher to crucial decision points in the design of a
study and analysis of collected data, these requirements would compel the
researcher to justify publicly the choices that were made at these crucial
decision points. The researcher who fails to consider how her chosen
methods compare to accepted norms for research design and data analysis,
and who is thus subsequently ill-prepared to defend any deviations from
these accepted norms, decreases her chances of publication in light of these
norms and increases her chances of professional embarrassment should the
research be published.29 In short, strict disclosure requirements may
encourage the researcher to assume a third-person perspective on her
research to anticipate and avoid possible criticisms of her work.
Furthermore, switching the focus from the quality-checking function
commonly associated with peer review to the need for an objectivity-
forcing mechanism for empirical research refines one of the main
arguments against peer review, namely, that editorial peer review and its
costs are unnecessary because empirical truth will ultimately win out in the
marketplace of ideas, where well-done studies are sorted from poorly-done
studies after publication.3" This argument assumes that the free publication
of empirical research undertaken from different perspectives, without more,
is a sufficient condition for reliable knowledge to be gained, and it ignores
the essential role that publicity and transparency play in the facilitation of
scientific dialogue intended to lead to greater knowledge. If empirical
claims are going to compete on the basis of their scientific merit, rather
than the identity or standing of the authors who make the claims, there
29. Cf Lee Sigelman, Foreword, in COMMITTEE ON PUBLICATIONS, AMERICAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, STYLE MANUAL FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE 5, 8 (revised ed. 2001)
[hereinafter STYLE MANUAL FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE] ("[W]hen you present your work clearly,
you run the risk of bringing its deficiencies out into the open for all to see."). Much of Epstein
and King's original article on empirical legal research is devoted to a discussion of the
methodological and inferential norms commonly followed within the social sciences. See Epstein
& King, supra note 10, at 14. According to Epstein and King, "[t]oo much legal scholarship
ignores the rules of inference and applies instead the 'rules' of persuasion and advocacy. These
'rules' have an important place in legal studies, but not when the goal is to learn about the
empirical world." Id. at 9. For additional practical advice on how to conduct an empirical study
and document its methodology, see generally Jonathan Nagler, Coding Style and Good
Computing Practices, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 488 (1995) (outlining methodological rules for
social science researchers).
30. See Goldsmith & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 156 ("Epstein and King's complaint elides
a critical possibility: the contest of 'particular versions' of truth ventilated by legal articles that
are tendentious when taken separately may, at the systemic level, produce increasingly accurate
approximations of truth, as scholar-advocates criticize the work of opposing camps.").
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needs to be disclosure of the foundation for the empirical claims in a
common language adequate to permit critical evaluation and extension.
Such disclosure allows us to move beyond a cacophony of subjective
opinions on the meaning of disparate findings to agreement on which
beliefs about the world are better or more justified in light of the
evidence.31
The remainder of this Essay defends these introductory arguments. In
Part I, I first defend the view that objectivity in science arises from the
publication of empirical claims in reproducible terms that permit critical
dialogue, and I briefly discuss the mechanisms that scientific communities
put in place to foster full disclosure. After laying this foundation for the
importance of disclosure in empirical research, I compare the disclosure
norms in empirical legal scholarship to the disclosure norms in social
scientific disciplines to illustrate that empirical legal scholarship fails to
endorse the norms of publicity and transparency endorsed by the social
sciences. I then propose, in Part II, a set of specific disclosure rules
designed to increase the objectivity of empirical legal scholarship, and I
argue that these rules should be institutionally imposed on empirical legal
research for two reasons: (1) few legal scholars and law review editors
possess the training or expertise in research methodology that would
inform them of the disclosures that should be made to facilitate critical
dialogue and replication; and (2) the systematic disclosure of information
across studies will enable the quantitative synthesis, or meta-analysis, of
research results, which is a crucial step in the development of social
scientific knowledge.32
31. In addition to public disclosure of evidence in a specific and intersubjectively accessible
language, the premise that scientific dialogue and agreement can lead to reliable knowledge, or
justified (true) belief, presumes, at a minimum, the existence of some standards for evaluating
evidence for its truth value. I consciously avoid debate on this latter point because a resolution on
this point is not essential to the Essay, although I am sympathetic to arguments about the disunity
of scientific method that contend that there is no single scientific method nor a consensus
definition of scientific rationality. See, e.g., Rachel Laudan & Larry Laudan, Dominance and the
Disunity of Method: Solving the Problems of Innovation and Consensus, 56 PHIL. SCi. 221
passim (1989) (pro-pluralism); George A. Reisch, Pluralism, Logical Empiricism, and the
Problem of Pseudoscience, 65 PHIL. SCI. 333 passim (1998) (anti-pluralism). Furthermore, as a
practical matter, social scientists generally employ many of the rules of inference that Epstein and
King have already discussed at length to evaluate the quality of evidence and the relation between
hypotheses and evidence, once the means for testing hypotheses and the resulting evidence are
made public. See generally Epstein & King, supra note 10 (describing the rules of inference and
their application).
32. Meta-analysis "allows the combining of numerical results from a few or many studies,
the accurate estimate of descriptive statistics and the explanation of inconsistencies as well as the
discovery of moderators and mediators in bodies of research findings." R. Rosenthal & M.R.
DiMatteo, Meta-Analysis: Recent Developments in Quantitative Methods for Literature Reviews,
52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 59, 61 (2001). As discussed below, meta-analysis can only be
performed on research reports that disclose certain bits of crucial information about research
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I. THE NEED FOR DISCLOSURE IN EMPIRICAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
A. The Centrality of Publicity and Transparency to the Objectivity and
Progress of Science
Non-epistemic, personal values may influence empirical research in
many ways, from the choice of research project to the manner of
presentation of data, and honorable intentions cannot fully guard against
the intrusion of personal biases and unintentional errors into the research
process.33 The economic and political setting in which empirical research
occurs may likewise influence the conduct of empirical research,34 and
unreliability in testing techniques and equipment may lead to variable
results.3" Given these possible sources of error and interpretive influences,
few today would suggest that empirical inquiry provides unbiased,
unmediated snapshots of the world as it really exists, that empirical inquiry
provides "objective" knowledge of this sort.36
Yet there is another important sense in which empirical inquiry, under
certain conditions, may still be said to lead to objective knowledge: "to
talk of the 'objectivity of scientific knowledge' in one sense is to talk of the
fact that such knowledge is in some way independent of any particular
individual, that it transcends the whim of the individual ... ."" From this
perspective, publicity and transparency in empirical inquiry play a crucial
role in the objectivity of knowledge because these features of empirical
research permit the communication of empirical claims in a form that
others can check for their reliability:
When we strive to be "objective," we try to recognize, and if
design, the data collected, and analysis of the data. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Ernan McMullin, Values in Science, 2 PSA: PROC. BIENNIAL MEETING PHIL.
Sci. ASS'N. 3, 3 (1982) ("[T]he claim that science is value-laden might no longer even seem
controversial, among philosophers of science, at least, who have become accustomed to seeing
the pillars of positivism fall, one by one.").
34. For a discussion of the influence of economic and political interests on empirical
research, see ZIMAN, supra note 22, at 67-82 (describing historical transformation from what
Ziman calls "academic science" to "post-academic science").
35. See, e.g., William Bechtel, Aligning Multiple Research Techniques in Cognitive
Neuroscience: Why Is It Important?, 69 PHIL. SCI. S48, S48 (2002) ("The conception that
demonstrating convergence between results procured with different techniques serves to provide
epistemic support for each of them stems in part from recognition that research techniques are
fallible.").
36. Cf. Kosso, supra note 3, at 245-46 ("Science is reliable, we might think, because its
claims must be tested against the objective facts of observations. But by now many philosophers
have conceded to a certain amount of theory dependence in observation and its role as an
objective standard is threatened.").
37. Brian Cart, Popper's Third World, 27 PHIL. Q. 214, 216 (1977). See also id. at 217
("[H]owever we ultimately describe scientific objectivity, that science transcends the individual
whim is a datum from which philosophy must start.").
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possible to eliminate, the errors and prejudices in what we say. We
expose our own ideas to our colleagues in order to eliminate personal
prejudices and distortions. In order to discover the prejudices of our
group, one method is to expose our ideas to other groups who may
not share the prejudices. Another method is to imagine alternative
positions which other people might defend, and meet the criticisms
which would arise. The search for objectivity involves the use of
such methods in striving for a consensus so fully justified that any
social group (actual or possible) will either assent to it, or can be
persuaded to make changes which they themselves see as
progressive, and which will bring them to that consensus.38
"[T]he essence of [this] aperspectival objectivity is communicability,
narrowing the range of genuine knowledge to coincide with that of public
knowledge."39
The public knowledge that results from "critical discussion"'  among
researchers acquires special credence or reliability because filtering
empirical claims through multiple perspectives increases the likelihood that
these claims will reflect feedback from the objects of study rather than
unintentional error, wishful thinking due to subjective idiosyncrasies, or
politically-motivated outcomes.4 As Deirdre McCloskey notes, this view
gives priority to agreement about what factual and inferential conclusions
38. R.G.A. Dolby, In Defence of a Social Criterion of Scientific Objectivity, 4 SCI. STUD.
187, 189 (1974). See also sources cited supra note 24 (discussing objectivity).
39. Lorraine Daston, Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective, 22 SOC. STUD. SCI. 597,
600 (1992). See also PETER MEDAWAR, PLUTO'S REPUBLIC 46 (1982) (declaring that scientific
reasoning is "a dialogue between two voices, the one imaginative and the other critical; a
dialogue, as I have put it, between the possible and the actual, between proposal and disposal,
conjecture and criticism, between what might be true and what is in fact the case").
40. See Karl Popper, Replies to My Critics, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL POPPER 961, 1025
(Paul. A. Schilpp ed., 1974) ("I do not know of anything more 'rational' than a well-conducted
critical discussion.").
41. See Railton, supra note 24, at 818. According to Railton, inquiry does not have to be
free of all value and bias to yield objective knowledge "if there nonetheless exist mechanisms that
would operate to make one's factual presuppositions more factual over time, or that would shape
values in such a way that the norms governing inquiry come to approximate norms that would, if
followed permit or encourage this sort of self-correction." Id. Railton goes on to assert that
"although we cannot, even in principle, have direct access to the objects of inquiry, there may yet
exist mechanisms of belief-formation that incorporate feedback from the object to the inquiring
subject." Id. How reliable this feedback is depends on the repetitiveness or lawfulness and
strength of the phenomenon or causal relationship being studied, but we must assume some
minimal level of redundancy or order to assume some meaningful feedback for predictive or
explanatory purposes. Cf. Herbert A. Simon, Black Ravens and a White Shoe, 42 BRIT. J. PHIL.
Sci. 339, 341-42 (1991) ("We conclude that a tolerable theory of confirmation that does not trip
over white shoes, and that has something to say about the character of science, can be built on the
foundation of a fairly weak hypothesis that the world is in some sense redundant and hence
lawful, at least not wholly random.").
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are warranted by particular calculations and comparisons:
The social character of scientific knowledge does not make it
arbitrary, touchie-feelie, mob-governed, or anything else likely to
bring it into disrepute. It is still, for instance, "objective," if that is a
worry. In vulgar usage the objective/subjective distinction beloved
of Western philosophy since Descartes means
discussable/undiscussable. But even in a sophisticated sense
"objectivity" has a necessarily social definition: we know that the
yield of corn in the Middle Ages was objectively low because we
converse with people who agree with our evidence and our
calculations and our standard of comparison validating the word
"1OW." 42
If skeptical minds agree that particular methods of inquiry yield particular
bits of evidence about the nature of some object under investigation, then
the evidence may be said to have some "objective" basis in reality.
43
However, it should be emphasized that it is not the fact of agreement
itself that bestows objectivity, but rather the means to agreement that a
particular observation or inference offers good evidence for an empirical
proposition. When a researcher displays her results publicly and
transparently, the evidence itself takes precedence and may convince even
those predisposed to disagree that a certain view of things is better than an
42. DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS 108-09 (David J. Depew ed.,
2d ed. 1998). I do not take McCloskey to be taking a particular stand on the philosophical issue
of whether agreement is sufficient for justified true belief, but rather to be making the practical
point about how knowledge advances in the social sciences. For a critique of agreement as the
grounds for justified true belief, see ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 29
(1999) ("Many contemporary writers tend to confuse justification with interpersonal agreement
.... But this view elevates agreement to an exaggerated epistemic position. An ability to elicit
agreement is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of justification.").
43. The proposition in the text derives its force from a corollary proposition: "if anyone can
show that you are mistaken, it is your opponents." HULL, supra note 24, at 348. See also id. at
435 ("[I]f science had to depend solely on individual scientists proving their own ideas wrong, it
would be in real trouble. The most important testing that occurs in science is one scientist testing
the views of another.").
The critical dialogue may take a variety of practical forms, from comments on
manuscripts circulated before publication, critical review during the editorial peer-review process,
post-publication critical comments about the research report whether the critique itself is
published or not, peer review of grant applications based on research, discussions at conferences
and scholarly presentations, direct attempts at replication, and perhaps most importantly through
what Jonathan Adler calls "implicit replication, which simply involves the idea of new research
building upon old." Jonathan E. Adler, Testimony, Trust, Knowing, 91 J. PHIL. 264, 267 (1994).
See also Michael J. Hones, Reproducibility as a Methodological Imperative in Experimental
Research, I PSA: PROC. BIENNIAL MEETING PHIL. SCI. ASS'N. 585, 595 (1990) ("In all cases,
however, it must be emphasized that this methodological imperative [of reproducibility] does not
place a great deal of importance upon the mere repetition of an experiment, but rather places great
emphasis upon the reproduction of well-established results in different experimental contexts or
situations.").
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alternative view. That is, the agreement follows from the evidence, which
follows from the application of particular methods of observation and
analysis to a particular problem, and so the evidence, rather than the fact of
agreement, is the basis for belief. However, if a researcher cannot display
her results in such a way that others may critically evaluate the results or
replicate the results themselves if they so choose, then the researcher's
evidence can be no basis for a justified belief regardless of whether like-
minded others agree." By publicly displaying her results, a researcher
makes it possible for others to demonstrate publicly the error in those
results or the robustness of the evidence offered. This mutual public
dialogue should lead to increasing levels of trust in the surviving, evolving
evidence.45
It is important to emphasize also that in this process mere publicity
about the results of empirical inquiry is not enough: a researcher must
make definite claims about the interconnection of particular methods of
inquiry and particular observations that result from these methods so that
others may demonstrate that this relation between methods and outcomes
exists. Failure to specify the details of an empirical investigation leaves the
initial researcher too much "wiggle room" when faced with supposedly
disconfirming evidence, for it allows the initial researcher to argue that
critics failed to replicate some crucial aspect of the original methodology or
failed to appreciate some important qualification on the empirical results.
Eventually the original researcher must commit to a definite public position
on the relationship between specific methods and specific results if the
researcher's claims are to be given any respect or credence within the
community of researchers who study the same object.
4 6
44. See, e.g., Gualtiero Piccinini, Epistemic Divergence and the Publicity of Scientific
Methods 13, at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edularchive/00000650/00/method publicity-new-new
_3.doc (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) ("By the present account, the publicity principle is an
epistemic norm meant to exclude from science all methods that, reliable as they may appear,
should not be trusted because either not all investigators can apply them to all pertinent questions
or... the methods yield different answers.") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
45. Or, as David Hull puts it, "[sicience is a social process in which scientists evaluate and
criticize each other's work, leading to successive improvement." HULL, supra note 24, at 361-
62.
46. See id. Hull lists several ways to fail in science. One is not to publish at all: "[a]nother
is to publish in ways calculated to get other scientists to ignore or reject your work." Id. Yet
another is "to write in a verbose, opaque style. Numerous scientists have suffered be-ause either
they were unable to write in a clear and effective manner or else they did not care to." Id.
The greater the social and political interest in empirical research, the more important this
public commitment to definite methods and circumscribed results becomes, because powerful
interests may exploit vague claims to serve their interests or dismiss unsubstantiated (and even
substantiated) results that conflict with their interests. See Warren, supra note 4, at 36 (relating
experiences from empirical bankruptcy research that lead her to conclude that "data that have
political support and a strong public relations campaign will be used over and over regardless of
their accuracy, while data that do not support the prevailing view-good or bad-will be
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Historically, communities of researchers with common epistemic
interests have developed mechanisms to encourage full disclosure and
intelligibility in research reports so that empirical claims may be subjected
to testing and review by others within the community, with the larger goal
of developing impersonal evidence and reliable knowledge about the
common objects of study.47 "The deployment of instruments to replace
qualitative appraisals, the use of experimental controls and double-blind
experiments, practices of replication and peer review-almost every
methodological maxim has as part its raison d'8tre the goal of insulating
the findings of the researchers from their preferences."48 Those epistemic
communities that advance knowledge claims using these objectivity-
forcing mechanisms fall within the traditional domain of science, whereas
those epistemic communities that fail to play by these meta-rules, such as
creationists and astrologers, do not.49
attacked"). See also Railton, supra note 24, at 823 ("[W]e should expect less objectivity-and
ultimately less warrant and knowledge-in those areas of inquiry where dominant preconceptions
and interests are less likely to prompt change-oriented activity that would promote genuine
feedback and challenge preconceptions. This is famously the case in the social sciences.").
47. At least since the nineteenth century, that is. For discussions of the evolution of the
concept of objectivity, see generally Peter Dear, From Truth to Disinterestedness in the
Seventeenth Century, 22 SOC. STUD. SCI. 619 (1992); Daston, supra note 39.
I do not mean to imply that altruistic or epistemic values alone fuel the critical give-and-
take that may lead to more reliable knowledge. Selfish pursuit of fame and fortune may be
sufficient to motivate critical scrutiny of other researchers' work. E.g., HULL, supra note 24, at
342 ("One reason why cheating is likely to be uncovered in science is that it is in the self-interest
of individual scientists to check work that threatens their own."); id. at 353 ("Another motive
which may seem even less admirable than wanting credit for one's contributions but which is
equally efficacious is to desire to refute those scientists with whom one disagrees.").
48. Noretta Koertge, The Zero-Sum Assumption and the Symmetry Thesis, 29 Soc. STUD.
Sci. 777, 778 (1999) (footnote omitted). See also ZIMAN, supra note 22, at 87 ("In every branch
of science ... there are elaborate procedures for reducing the effects of subjectivity in empirical
research.").
49. Ziman emphasizes the role of collective scrutiny in establishing a scientific discipline:
[F]or an item of information to be acceptable as a potential contribution to science, it has
to reach a minimum standard of credibility and relevance. What is more, in accordance
with the norm of criticism, it has to be presented in a form capable of undergoing further
communal tests before it counts as "scientific knowledge" in the fullest sense ....
[E]very scientific discipline has its own criteria of "scientificity." But what they all have
in common is this lengthy period of expert scrutiny, much of it conducted in public.
Researchers naturally seek results of the kind that are most likely to survive this process
relatively unscathed.
ZIMAN, supra note 22, at 85.
Kitcher distinguishes the scientist from the pseudo-scientist by the former's willingness
to discuss the evidence and its logical relation to a theory and the latter's unwillingness to
recognize evidence or arguments that might destabilize preferred positions:
The primary division is a psychological one between scientists and pseudo-scientists.
The behavior of creation scientists indicates a kind of inflexibility, deafness, or
blindness. They make an objection to some facet of evolutionary biology. Darwin's
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First among the objectivity-forcing mechanisms employed by
traditional scientific communities are "[r]elatively rigid standards for
reporting results, including the quantification of almost everything
possible,"5 ° with an emphasis on the details necessary for others to simulate
one's methods to check for similar results.5 Placing these details into
published reports, rather than conveying the information by word of mouth,
standardizes the information communicated, expands and democratizes the
universe of possible critics, protects the author in the case of a priority
dispute about recognition for a finding, and provides a fame-based
incentive to perform research. The publication of the research report raises
objectivity concerns of its own, however, for unless the rigid reporting
standards are met in the report, the report cannot further scientific dialogue.
This informational quality concern led publishers of research reports
to adopt a second objectivity-forcing mechanism in the form of editorial
defenders respond by suggesting that the objection is misformulated, that it does not
attack what Darwinists claim, that it rests on false assumptions, or that it is logically
fallacious. How do creation scientists reply? Typically, by reiterating the argument.
Anyone who has followed exchanges in this controversy or has read the transcripts of a
series of debates sees that there is no adaptation to any of the principal criticisms.
PHILIP KITCHER, THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE 195 (1993). See also HULL, supra note 24, at
343 ("Perhaps the claims made by creation scientists are testable, but creation scientists
themselves actually do little or nothing by way of genuine test. More than this, when others
expose their views to tests, creation scientists ignore the results, 'refusing to allow their position
to be falsified.' " (citation omitted)).
Thagard provides a complementary definition of pseudoscience:
A theory or discipline which purports to be scientific is pseudoscientific if and only if:
(1) it has been less progressive than alternative theories over a long period of time,
and faces many unsolved problems; but
(2) the community of practitioners makes little attempt to develop the theory
towards solutions of the problems, shows no concern for attempts to evaluate the
theory in relation to others, and is selective in considering confirmations and
disconfirmations.
Paul R. Thagard, Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience, 1 PSA: PROC. BIENNIAL MEETING PHIL.
SCI. ASS'N. 223, 227-28 (1978). Thagard finds astrology to be a pseudoscience under this
definition: "What makes astrology pseudoscientific is not that it lacks periods of Kuhnian normal
science, but that its proponents adopt uncritical attitudes of 'normal' scientists despite the
existence of more progressive alternative theories." Id. at 228.
50. Theodore M. Porter, Quantification and the Accounting Ideal in Science, 22 SOC. STUD.
SCI. 633, 647 (1992). See also K. Brad Wray, A Defense of Longino's Social Epistemology, 66
PHIL. SCI. S538, S547 (1999) ("Consensus plays a crucial role in ordering and organizing our
observation reports so that they can function as data.").
51. David Hull, Openness and Secrecy in Science: Their Origins and Limitations, 10 SCI.
TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 4, 8 (1985) ("If a scientist wanted to be treated seriously and to be
remembered as anything but an unappreciated precursor, he had to present his views in ways
calculated to convince his contemporaries.").
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peer review. As David Hull explains, the Royal Society of London
initiated a system of pre-publication expert review for reports to be
published in its journal, Philosophical Transactions, because the secretary
of the Society "did not know enough in all the various areas then being
investigated to pass knowledgeable judgment on all of them," and so he
sought the assistance of outside experts to help authenticate the research
reported.52 Thus, peer review became the first step in the process of
subjecting empirical claims to intersubjective scrutiny, while also serving
to ensure that discoveries were published in a form intelligible to other
investigators who may seek to test or build on the reported work.53
Scientific disciplines employ other objectivity-forcing mechanisms,54
but publicity and transparency in empirical research are most fundamental
to the scientific process: if we can never be sure about objective "truth" in
a metaphysical sense, we can still achieve more objective knowledge by
engaging in critical dialogue about the reliability of empirical claims with
others in our epistemic community. In this view, it is not simply enough to
place one's empirical claims into the relevant marketplace of ideas in any
form, but rather the methodological grounding for one's empirical
observations must be stated in a form that is accessible and reproducible by
52. HULL, supra note 24, at 323-24. See also Hull, supra note 51, at 7 ("[W]hen the Royal
Society bestowed its imprimatur, it wanted some assurance that the work in question was not
errant nonsense .... As a result, [Secretary Oldenburg] began to rely on the advice of outside
experts to help him decide which communications were worthy of publication.").
53. See Robert A. Lineberry & Nita A. Lineberry, Our Brother's Keeper: Authenticity,
Accountability, and the Social Science Quarterly Project, 28 PS: POL. SC. & POL. 484, 485
(1995). According to the Lineberrys:
Replication is essentially about two things: authenticity and accountability.
Authenticity means that the work of the author is essentially accurate; accountability
means that it is essentially fed through a larger community of scholars-the peer review
process-and found generally satisfactory, interesting, or important. There is no
requirement that every scholar in the area agree with the methods or the sources, but
there is a requirement that the methods or the sources be known.
Id.
54. Particularly important, and complementary to the rigid reporting standards, are use of
statistics and mechanical devices. Researchers turned to "statistical methods, the more
mechanical the better, to standardize their results in a form immediately accessible to others."
Daston, supra note 39, at 612 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 609 ("As Theodore Porter has
argued, certain forms of quantification have come to be allied with objectivity not because they
necessarily mirror reality more accurately, but because they serve the ideal of communicability,
especially across barriers of distance and distrust." (footnote omitted)). And researchers moved
to the use of mechanical instruments and devices, such as telescopes, microscopes, and cameras,
to "battle[] the general, all-too-human tendencies to aestheticize, anthropomorphize, judge,
interpret, or in any other way 'tamper' with the givens of nature." Lorraine Daston, The Moral
Economy of Science, 10 OSIRIS 2, 20 (1995). Thus, any researcher who employs an instrument of
the same specifications should be capable of making the same observations as the original




others and definite observational claims must be made so that the linkage
between methods and outcomes may be tested. Absent such disclosure,
there can be no scientifically rational basis for sorting the good empirical
studies from the bad.
The mandate for full disclosure in empirical research applies with
particular force to the social sciences due to special difficulties in
accumulating knowledge about social objects of inquiry. For a host of
reasons, individual empirical studies of human behavior in social settings
provide very limited information about the nature of behavior.55 However,
when research reports provide detailed information on methods, data, and
statistical analyses of data, it is possible to combine the findings of
individual studies using meta-analytic or quantitative synthesis techniques
to arrive at a more comprehensible and reliable understanding of the nature
and strength of relations among variables.56 Without adequate disclosure of
underlying research information, such meta-analysis is not possible, and the
55. See, e.g., John E. Hunter & Frank L. Schmidt, Cumulative Research Knowledge and
Social Policy Formulation: The Critical Role of Meta-Analysis, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
324, 341 (1996) ("Meta-analysis has explicated the critical role of sampling error, measurement
error, and other artifacts in determining the observed findings and statistical power of individual
studies. It has shown that, contrary to widespread belief, no single primary study can provide
more than tentative evidence on any issue.").
The complexity of human behavior does not provide a particularly useful explanation for
the slow accumulation of knowledge in the social sciences relative to that in the physical and
natural sciences because many objects of study in the latter fields involve great complexity, as
well. The complications I primarily have in mind are methodological in form, including the
highly reactive nature of social scientific objects of study; difficulty controlling for different
intentions, preferences, and beliefs among subjects; the physical and ethical limitations on the
types of experiments that can be performed on humans; the cost and difficulty of obtaining large
samples of persons and situations and, concomitantly, the relatively weak power and
generalizability of many social science experiments; the heavy reliance on statistical significance
testing; the multiple ways in which abstract behavioral and social concepts may be
operationalized for purposes of concrete empirical testing; and in general the strong ceteris
paribus limitations on social scientific findings.
56. See Rosenthal & DiMatteo, supra note 32, at 61 ("Meta-analysis allows the combining
of numerical results from a few or many studies, the accurate estimate of descriptive statistics and
the explanation of inconsistencies as well as the discovery of moderators and mediators in bodies
of research findings."); Frank L. Schmidt, Statistical Significance Testing and Cumulative
Knowledge in Psychology: Implications for Training of Researchers, I PSYCHOL. METHODS
115, 123 (1996) ("Applications of meta-analysis to accumulated research literatures have
generally shown that research findings are not nearly as conflicting as we had thought and that
useful general conclusions can be drawn from past research."). Schmidt, one of the strongest
proponents of meta-analysis, characterizes the use of meta-analysis as crucial to the scientific
status of the social sciences: "[i]t means that the behavioral and social sciences can attain the
status of true sciences; they are not doomed forever to the status of quasi-sciences or
pseudosciences." Id. For a good example of the informational gains that can be made using
meta-analysis, see F.D. Richard et al., One Hundred of Years of Social Psychology Quantitatively
Described, 7 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 331 (2003) (using meta-analytic techniques to synthesize over
25,000 social psychology studies involving approximately eight million participants). For a
discussion of criticisms of meta-analysis, see Rosenthal & DiMatteo, supra note 32, at 66-68.
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ability of a research report to contribute to the systematic development of a
body of knowledge is lost.
57
B. Disclosure Norms in Social Scientific Research
Within the social sciences, strong norms exist about the information
that should be contained in research reports, and these norms reflect the
importance of publicity and transparency in rendering research capable of
intersubjective testing and review. The guiding principle is that a research
report should disclose "sufficient detail to permit reviewers to understand
and evaluate what has been done and ... to permit other scholars to carry
out similar analyses on other data sets."58 This guiding principle, which
may be referred to as the replication norm of disclosure, 59 explicitly
57. See Rosenthal & DiMatteo, supra note 32, at 64 ("It is fair to suggest that no
appropriately collected data from a well-designed study should ever be wasted. Meta-analysis
allows the combination of results from studies with samples so small that they never achieve
statistical significance.").
The following information is needed for meta-analytic purposes: (a) specific
information about the demographic and any special characteristics of the research respondents
and information on how the respondents were selected; (b) disclosure of the key variables or
interventions studied and how tests of relationships between variables or for the effect of an
intervention were operationalized; (c) specific information about the research design employed
and sample sizes for all conditions of the study (e.g., was an experimental design used and, if so,
was a between-subjects, within-subjects, or mixed design utilized, and how many subjects
participated in each experimental condition?); (d) the time frame in which the data was collected;
and (e) specific statistical information needed in the calculation of effect-size statistics and their
variances (the effect-size statistic serves as the key data generated from a meta-analysis; this
statistic provides information about the direction of an effect, the magnitude of an effect, or
ideally both, with respect to the effect of one or more variables on one or more other variables).
See MARK W. LIPSEY & DAVID B. WILSON, PRACTICAL META-ANALYSIS 16-23 (2001)
(discussing the criteria used for deciding whether to include an individual study within a meta-
analysis); id. at 34-37 (discussing the role of effect size in meta-analysis). See also Rosenthal &
DiMatteo, supra note 32, at 69-70 (describing the basic steps in performing a meta-analysis,
including a discussion of the information needed from individual studies).
58. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Instructions to Contributors, General
Considerations, at http://www.apsanet.org/apsrinst.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). The physical sciences follow the same rule: "the means by
which the investigator gathered his or her own evidence bearing on the question or hypothesis is
described in detail sufficient to enable another investigator to replicate the research." STYLE
MANUAL COMMITTEE, COUNCIL OF BIOLOGY EDITORS, SCIENTIFIC STYLE AND FORMAT: THE
CBE MANUAL FOR AUTHORS, EDITORS, AND PUBLISHERS 589 (6th ed. 1994). King identifies a
replication standard, almost universally accepted among quantitative analysts, which requires
published results to include at least enough information for a third party to recreate the results
without more from the author. "The replication standard does not actually require anyone to
replicate the results .... It only requires sufficient information to be provided-in the article or
book or in some other publicly accessible form-so that the results could in principle be
replicated." Gary King, Replication, Replication, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL, 444, 444 (1995). See
also Harriet Zuckerman, Norms and Deviant Behavior in Science, 9 SCI. TECH. & HUMAN
VALUES 7, 7 (1984) ("[T]he principled requirement that scientific work be reproducible is a
powerful mechanism of social control in science.").
59. Herrnson unpacks the concept of replication to distinguish between the tasks of
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governs submissions to the flagship journals within economics, political
science, and psychology. 6
reanalysis, by means of replication or verification, and secondary analysis:
Replication is not the same as reanalysis, verification, or secondary analysis. The four
terms have very different meanings.
A reanalysis studies the same problem as that investigated by the initial investigator; the
same data base as that used by the initial investigator may or may not be used. If
different, independently collected data are used to study the same problem, the reanalysis
is called a replication. If the same data are used, the reanalysis is called a verification.
In a secondary analysis, data collected to study one set of problems are used to study a
different problem. Secondary analysis frequently, but not necessarily, depends on the
use of multipurpose datasets. Data sharing is essential for all verifications and all
secondary analyses; it may or may not be involved in replications.
Paul S. Herrnson, Replication, Verification, Secondary Analysis, and Data Collection in Political
Science, 28 PS: POL. SCl. & POE. 452, 452 (1995) (citation omitted) (quoting COMM. ON NAT'L
STATISTICS, ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS, in SHARING RESEARCH DATA, at 9 (Stephen E.
Fienberg et al eds. 1993)). I use the shorthand "replication norm" to refer simply to the notion
that empirical researchers should endeavor to disclose sufficient information to allow other
researchers to engage in reanalysis or to engage in secondary analysis, as those terms are
described by Hermson, with respect to the evidence and claims presented in the research report.
60. The submission guidelines for the American Economic Review, published by the
American Economic Association, expressly state that it is "the policy of the American Economic
Review to publish papers only if the data used in the analysis are clearly and precisely
documented and are readily available to any researcher for purposes of replication. Details of the
computations sufficient to permit replication must be provided." AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW,
Submissions, at http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/submissions.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). The submission instructions for the American Political
Science Review, published by the American Political Science Association, contain a similar
prescription in favor of disclosure sufficient to permit replication. See AMERICAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE REVIEW, supra note 58. The American Psychological Association imposes similar
guidelines. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, PUBLICATION MANUAL OF THE
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION xxvi (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter APA PUBLICATION
MANUAL] ("The first principle is that researchers need to describe the details of what they did,
with whom they did it, how they measured it, and what they found at an appropriate level of
specificity-and one that enables others to replicate the research.").
Interestingly, neither the publication guidelines for the journals published by the
American Sociological Association ("ASA") nor the ASA Style Guide contains express reference
to the replication norm of disclosure. See AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, STYLE
GUIDE (2d ed. 1997); AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, Preparation Checklist for ASA
Manuscripts, at http://www.asanet.org/pubs/asaguidelinesnew.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). Given the reliance on peer review for these journals
and the likely expectation of education in sociological research, perhaps explicit citation of the
replication norm for sociological publications is seen as unnecessary.
The author instructions for Sociological Methodology, a journal published under the
auspices of the ASA, do list "expository clarity" as a factor considered in selection of
manuscripts, but the instructions do not expressly direct authors to include information sufficient
for replication purposes. See SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY, Author Guidelines, at http://
blackwellpublishing.com/submit.asp?ref=0081-1750 (last-visited Nov. 14, 2004) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). The submission guidelines for The Sociological Quarterly, which
is not published by the ASA, do indicate that clarity of presentation and strength of evidence are
positive factors in selection of manuscripts, but they do not expressly endorse the replication
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The editorial peer review process employed by social science journals
fosters compliance with the replication norm of disclosure in two ways.
First, during the review process, referees and editors may request that the
author disclose additional information about methods and results for
inclusion in the report.6' Second, the expectation of peer review
encourages the voluntary, pre-emptive disclosure of methodological and
data analysis information by authors to increase the likelihood that a
submitted manuscript will receive positive reviews; a research report that
fails to disclose important methodological information or that conveys this
information poorly is likely to be rejected for publication in a peer-
disclosure norm. See THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY, TSQ Submission Information, at
http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/tsq/edsub.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) ("In every case,
preference will be given to cutting-edge sociological theory and research manuscripts which
display originality, clear arguments, persuasive evidence, intelligent analysis, and clear writing.")
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
This state of affairs for sociology journals is not unique. A recent study of political
science journals found that few "had a replication policy clearly stated on the [journal] webpage
or in the instructions printed in the journal itself." Nils Petter Gleditsch & Claire Metelits, The
Replication Debate, 4 INT'L STUD. PERSP. 72, 74 (2003). Thus, the findings of this study suggest
that compliance with the replication norm often occurs through voluntary compliance on the part
of the author or through requests during the manuscript review process. See id. at 76 ("Overall,
the survey does not seem to provide much encouragement for those who favor a strong replication
requirement. Data-replication policies seem to have been strengthened only slightly over the past
five years. Journals that proclaim a replication policy often fail to implement or enforce it.").
61. The publication manuals for both political science and psychology research make clear
that peer reviewers may demand additional methodological details during the review process and
that lack of clarity is grounds for a "revise and resubmit" decision. See APA PUBLIC-ATION
MANUAL, supra note 60, at 305 (discussing how manuscripts that fail to convey their messages
clearly will be "returned to the author for revision prior to further editorial consideration"); id. at
298 ("Researchers must make their data available to the editor any time during the review and
production process if questions arise with respect to the accuracy of the report. Otherwise, the
submitted manuscript can be rejected."); STYLE MANUAL FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE, supra note
29, at 11 ("As part of the review process, authors may be asked to submit additional
documentation if procedures (for example, techniques employed in data collection or analysis) are
not sufficiently clear; the review process works most efficiently if such information is given in
the initial submission."). See also WELLER, supra note 18, at 173 ("The few studies that looked
at the value of the review process from the author's perspective found that authors felt that review
did not result in substantive changes, but that it did help with structuring conclusions, clarifying
data, and writing style." (citation omitted)); Edward B. Portis & Jon R. Bond, Comment, 28 PS:
POL. SCI. & POL. 461, 461 (1995) ("[A] good deal of the review process typically is concerned
with the adequacy of data, and prospective authors often must supply additional information and
answer questions about their data and the methods used to collect it to satisfy reviewers and
editors"); Paula A. Rochon et al., Comparison of Review Articles Published in Peer-Reviewed
and Throwaway Journals, 287 JAMA 2853, 2855 (2002) ("As expected, peer-reviewed journal
articles were of superior methodologic and reporting quality relative to articles published in
throwaway journals."); Robert J. Sternberg, Tacit Agreements Between Authors and Editors, 8
BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 746, 747 (1985) ("Only an extreme optimist would expect a submitted
article to be accepted the first time around .... Any article-whether or not it has been
published--can be improved, and it is considered fair game to let the author have one or two




Although some fields within the social sciences rely on the ability of
authors and manuscript reviewers to discern the particular disclosures
needed to comply with the general replication norm, the American
Psychological Association ("APA") provides explicit, detailed directions
about the disclosures that should be made in reports of psychological
research. These instructions direct authors to make clear the hypotheses
they sought to test and the means of testing, including detailed disclosure
about data collection and any experimental or quantitative tests conducted
on the data. Specifically, the APA Publication Manual instructs authors
first to introduce the problem being studied, place the problem into the
context of prior research, and provide a "formal statement of your
hypotheses" and "a definition of the variables" used to test the
hypotheses.63 The author should then provide detailed information about
data gathering (the "Method" section of a research paper should report on
the means of recruitment and characteristics of participants, the
experimental materials or other apparatuses used, and the actual procedural
steps followed during data collection) and data analysis (the "Results"
section should describe the statistical analyses conducted on the data and
the statistical results obtained, including detailed information about
descriptive and inferential statistics).' With respect to data analysis, the
Publication Manual encourages the reporting of effect-size information,
and at a minimum the research report should contain sufficient information
for other interested researchers to calculate an effect-size measure, namely,
test statistics and sample size information.65 Additionally, authors must
disclose their institutional affiliations and any other circumstances that
could be perceived to create a conflict of interest, acknowledge
62. See WELLER, supra note 18, at 50 (reviewing studies of reasons for rejection by peer-
reviewed journals and noting that "poor presentation or poor writing" is the most frequently cited
reason for rejection of manuscripts); Douglas P. Peters & Stephen J. Ceci, Peer-Review Practices
of Psychological Journals: The Fate of Published Articles, Submitted Again, 5 BEHAV. & BRAIN
Sci. 187, 190 (1982) (reporting from a study of editorial peer review that "[plerhaps the most
serious objections that reviewers had about the manuscripts were directed toward the studies'
designs and statistical analyses").
Some contend that referees place too much emphasis on methods and data analysis. See
Robert Hogan, The Insufficiencies of Methodological Inadequacy, 5 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 216,
216 (1982) ("Academic psychology seems peculiarly prone to what medieval scholars called the
fallacy of dogmatic Methodism--that is, when a problem is analyzed by the proper method, truth
will somehow inevitably emerge.").
63. See APA PUBLICATION MANUAL, supra note 60, at 11-12 (directing that this
information be contained in the "Introduction" section of the paper).
64. See id. at 12-18.
65. See id. at 18 ("You are encouraged to provide effect-size information, although in most
cases such measures are readily obtainable whenever the test statistics (e.g., t and F) and sample
sizes (or degrees of freedom) are reported.").
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contributions by non-authors, and provide information on how the authors
may be contacted with inquiries.66 Finally, authors who seek to publish in
APA journals must state within the article or certify to journal editors that
they complied with APA ethical principles in the conduct of research on
humans or other animals.67
Notwithstanding the general replication norm and more specific rules
for disclosure such as those within psychology, important details about
methods and data analysis may be omitted from the final, published
research report following even rigorous peer review. The possibility of
imperfect compliance with the replication norm explains the existence of
another, complementary norm: researchers should not only make
disclosures sufficient to allow others to replicate their research, but they
should also freely share their data and calculations with others.68 Indeed,
the scientist who refuses to share her data or disclose omitted
methodological details after reasonable requests may face ridicule, and
even charges of fraud or obfuscation of results.69
66. See id. at 164-65.
67. The APA Publication Manual requires authors to certify that they followed Principles
6.06-6.20 of the "Ethical Principles" with respect to conducting research with humans and
animals before their articles can be published in APA journals. See id. at 298. Failure to follow
these standards can be grounds for rejecting a manuscript for publication or for retraction of a
published article. Id.
68. See Stephen J. Ceci, Scientists' Attitudes Toward Data Sharing, 13 SCI. TECH. &
HUMAN VALUES 45, 51 (1988) ("Moreover, based on an analysis of answers to several related
questions, it was clear that scientists in all fields endorse the principle of data sharing as a
desirable norm of science."). However, compliance with this complementary norm is not perfect
either. See id. (noting that while eighty-seven percent of respondents reported that they routinely
respond to colleagues' requests for their published findings or data, fifty-nine percent of
respondents also claimed that their colleagues were not apt to share data).
69. See, e.g., PETER MEDAWAR, THE THREAT AND THE GLORY: REFLECTIONS ON SCIENCE
AND SCIENTISTS 71-75 (1959) (recounting how Medawar and his collaborators discovered
research fraud by William Summerlin through their efforts to replicate Summerlin's skin graft
experiments with mice and their unmet requests to Summerlin for details about his methods). A
recent high profile case within social psychology illustrates the fraud-control value of attempts at
replication and requests for additional disclosure. Following failed attempts to replicate the
published results of work by Karen Ruggiero and a request for data disclosure, Ruggiero resigned
her professorship at the University of Texas at Austin and retracted published results because of
improper data manipulation. See Bridget Murray, Research Fraud Needn't Happen at All, 33
MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY, at http://www.apa.org/monitor/feb02/fraud.html (Feb. 2002)
(reporting that Ruggiero's research was called into question "when others tried to replicate it.
Following the allegations, she resigned her assistant professor position at the University of Texas
at Austin and submitted retractions to two journals-one of them APA's Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology.") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Christopher Chow, U.S.
Government Sanctions Harvard Prof. for Falsifying Research, at http://www.academia.org/
campus- reports/2002/january_2002_3.html (Jan. 2002) ("The research was first exposed as
fraudulent when one of her assistants, David M. Marx, became suspicious after Ruggiero refused
to show him her raw research data. When Marx asked Harvard to investigate further, she
admitted to using "invalid data" in her research studies at Harvard.") (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Findings of Scientific Misconduct, 66 Fed. Reg. 64,266 (Dep't of Health
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Recently, a few journals within political science adopted a more
formalized approach to the post-publication sharing of data and other
detailed research information.70 This policy makes the publication of data
sets along with the information necessary to utilize a data set a condition of
publication, in the hope that this public archiving of data will improve both
the quality of the original research report and the ease with which
& Human Servs. Dec. 12, 2001) (notice of final action) (reporting findings of research fraud),
available at http://grantsl.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-02-020.html (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). Consider also the case of history professor Michael Bellesiles,
who resigned his position at Emory University after questions were raised about the data forming
the basis for his award-winning book, Arming America. See Florence Olsen, Historian Resigns
After Report Questions His Gun Research, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 8, 2002, at A17. See
also James Lindgren, Falling From Grace: Arming America and the Bellesiles Scandal, I l1
YALE L.J. 2195 passim (2002) (citing the large numbers of errors which supported Bellesiles's
research as evidence of the seriousness of the situation).
70. In 2003, the editors of four international relations journals (Journal of Peace Research,
International Studies Quarterly, International Interactions, and Journal of Conflict Resolution)
issued a joint statement that:
Authors of quantitative empirical articles must make their data available for replication
purposes. A statement of how that is done should appear in the first footnote of the
article. Required material would include all data, specialized computer programs,
program recodes, and an explanatory file describing what is included and how to
reproduce the published results. This material must be posted by the month of
publication, except when, with agreement of the Editor, the deadline is extended to
accommodate special need of an author to employ the data for subsequent publications.
Information that must remain confidential-such as that which would identify survey
respondents-should be removed. All files should be sent electronically to the Managing
Editor for posting on a website maintained by the journal for the purpose. In addition,
authors may send the material to www.icpsr.umich.edu, and any other sites they wish to
use.
Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., Editors' Joint Statement: Minimum Replication Standards for
International Relations Journals, 4 INT'L STUD. Q. 105, 105 (2003). Currently, the Journal of
Conflict Resolution and the Journal of Peace Research include a data sharing policy similar to the
one above within their online submission guidelines. See JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION,
Submission Requirements, at http://www.yale.edu/unsy/jcrsubmit.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2004)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, Notes for Authors
18, at http://prio.no/fileslfile4l388_jpr-notesforauthors.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review); INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS, Instructions for
Authors, at http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/authors/giniauth.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). However, the current editor of International Studies
Quarterly indicated in personal communication that the data archiving requirement would soon
be made an explicit part of that journal's online submission instructions. E-mail from Steven
Poe, Editor in Chief, International Studies Quarterly, to Gregory Mitchell, Assistant Professor of
Law, Florida State University College of Law (Jan. 28, 2004, 15:06 EST) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). The Style Manual for Political Science encourages, but does not require,
that authors who publish in the American Political Science Review make their data sets available
in a public archive. See STYLE MANUAL FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE, supra note 29, at 44-45.
This move to a more formal data sharing policy resulted largely from the efforts of Gary
King. See King, supra note 58, at 444; Symposium on Replication in International Studies
Research, 4 INT'L STUD. PERSP. 72 (2003); Symposium on Verification/Replication, 28 PS: POL.
SCI. & POL. 443 (1995).
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replication and extension can be undertaken.7 A corollary benefit for
authors who comply with this policy is the greater attention that their
publications and data may receive." This move toward public archiving of
data as a condition of publication recognizes that post-publication requests
for disclosure serve as only a weak complement to the replication norm:
authors die and become impossible to contact for other reasons, making it
difficult at times to replicate a study or determine whether important
information is missing from a research report if the data and research
information are not within the public domain.
C. Disclosure Norms in Legal Research
As compared to the more established empirical research fields within
the social sciences, the replication norm and its concomitants find little
expression within the publication system for empirical legal research. The
manual for uniform citation practice in legal scholarship, The Bluebook,
contains no explicit endorsement of the general replication norm and
contains no special rules about the information that should be disclosed
when reporting original empirical work. Likewise, the leading law reviews
in their instructions to authors do not expressly endorse the replication
norm or the public archiving of data.73 Although silent on the replication
norm, the Association of American Law Schools' "Statement of Good
Practices" does indicate that law professors should voluntarily disclose
information that might be seen as an influence on scholarly conclusions:
A law professor has a responsibility to preserve the integrity and
71. See, e.g., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Getting Firm on Replication, 4 INT'L STUD. PERSP.,
98, 99-100 (2003) (arguing that data archiving would improve the publication process by
"speeding up manuscript reviews by eliminating some revise-and-resubmit decisions, [and]
providing better information for referees to make more decisive recommendations to editors.
Additionally, we can reduce errors in published research and facilitate replication tests designed
to probe the robustness of findings.").
72. One recent study of articles published in the Journal of Peace Research, which has a
formal data-sharing policy, found that publicly archiving the data reported in an article seemed
"to increase the popularity of the article. An author who makes data available is on average cited
twice as frequently as an article with no data but otherwise equivalent credentials, including
degree of formalization." Nils Petter Gledistch et al., Posting Your Data: Will You Be Scooped
or Will You Be Famous?, 4 INT'L STUD. PERSP., 89, 92 (2003).
73. See, e.g., COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, Submissions, at http://www.columbialawreview.org/
informationlsubmissions.cfm (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); HARVARD LAW REVIEW, Guidelines for Submitting Manuscripts, at http://www.
harvardlawreview.org/manuscript.shtml (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, Submissions, at http://students.law.umich.edu/
mlr/submissions.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, Submissions, at http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/
submissions/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); YALE LAW JOURNAL, Submissions, at http:llwww.yale.edulyaleljlsubmissions.html
(last visited Nov. 14, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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independence of legal scholarship. Sponsored or remunerated
research should always be acknowledged with full disclosure of the
interests of the parties. If views expressed in an article were also
espoused in the course of representation of a client or in consulting,
this should be acknowledged.74
However, The Bluebook does not expressly incorporate this disclosure
norm, nor does consensus exist among law professors as to the particular
information that should be disclosed to satisfy this norm.75 In short, the
publication guidelines for legal scholarship provide little express direction
to empirical legal researchers with respect to their disclosure obligations.
Notwithstanding this silence on disclosure norms, the compulsive
footnoting practice within legal scholarship may serve as a salutary
measure for disclosure purposes.76 If the primary purpose of footnotes is
"to show support for a legal or factual proposition or argument," then it is
reasonable to conclude that footnotes to a research report will detail the
basis for empirical claims contained with the research report.77
Unfortunately, absent clear directions on what methodological and
statistical information should be disclosed as support for empirical claims,
footnotes written and monitored by professors and student editors who
often lack special training in empirical research offer little guarantee that
74. American Association of Law Schools, Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors
in the Discharge of Their Ethical and Professional Responsibilities (adopted by Executive
Committee Nov. 17, 1989) at http://www.aals.org/ethic.htmil (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
75. See William R. Slomanson, Legal Scholarship Blueprint, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 431, 441
(2000) (reporting on debate within the legal academy on the level of disclosure with respect to
funding sources for research); Richard Lippitt, Comment, Intellectual Honesty, Industry and
Interest Sponsored Professorial Works, and Full Disclosure: Is the Viewpoint Earning the
Money, or Is the Money Earning the Viewpoint?, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1075, 1075 (2001) ("[T]he
requirement for complete and total disclosure of the full nature of the sponsoring party's support
remains largely undefined, leaving to each individual scholar's discretion what degree of
disclosure he wishes to adhere to."); see also Ronald K.L. Collins, A Letter on Scholarly Ethics,
45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 139, 141-42 (1995) (arguing for a mandatory, detailed disclosure of financial
and other outside interests that might give rise to an appearance of conflict of interest); Michael
Sean Quinn, "Scholarly Ethics": A Response, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 110, 113 (1996) (arguing that
"Collins's call for mandatory full disclosure is beset by a series of epistemological deficiencies").
76. 'A statement such as this surely calls for a footnote. Therefore: see, e.g., Arthur D.
Austin, Footnote Skullduggery and Other Bad Habits (footnotes omitted from title), 44 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1009, 1011 (1990) (stating that law journal footnotes are no longer "a painful hangover
from the composition of the main event of the text; the 'barking' from the cellar of the page has
taken over. Authors have recognized that discerning, intelligent-or unethical-manipulation of
footnotes can be a significant factor in achieving promotion, tenure, and status." (footnotes
omitted)).
77. THE BLUEBOOK, supra note 26, at 4; cf. ANTHONY GRAFrON, THE FOOTNOTE: A
CURIOUS HISTORY vii (1997) ("[Footnotes] are the humanist's rough equivalent of the scientist's
report on data: they offer the empirical support for stories told and arguments presented. Without
them, historical theses can be admired or resented, but they cannot be verified or disproved.").
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law review reports of empirical research will comply with the replication
norm.78 This dearth of expertise in empirical research is significant not
only because it suggests low levels of voluntary compliance with disclosure
norms before publication, but also because it suggests that few within the
audience for empirical legal research will possess the expertise needed to
enforce the disclosure norms after publication by requesting information,
critiquing the results, and refining prior research.
In sum, at least four characteristics of the law review system for
publication of empirical legal scholarship suggest cause for heightened
concern about the disclosures associated with empirical legal research, as
compared to the disclosures associated with empirical research published in
social science journals. First, flagship law reviews and The Bluebook do
not insist on compliance with the replication norm and its concomitants.79
Second, law reviews do not employ a formal system of pre-publication
review of empirical research by experts in empirical methods to govern the
disclosures contained within research reports. Third, law professor authors
and law review editors rarely possess the special training or experience in
empirical research that would permit them to determine on their own what
disclosures should be made to adhere to the replication norm. Fourth, few
members of the primary audience for empirical legal research possess the
expertise in empirical research that would enable them to enforce the
replication norm post-publication.
Of course, identifying these causes for concern does not guarantee that
78. Cf. Austin, supra note 76, at 1028-29 (arguing that there is considerable doubt that
student editors are capable of comprehending and evaluating articles submitted by writers
(including law professors) who are experts in other disciplines because "[w]hen footnotes are
technical 'it is less likely that a randomly selected student editor will be able to detect outrageous
non sequiturs, let alone subtler analytic failures that might seem obvious to cognoscenti.'"
(footnotes omitted)).
Whereas the great majority of investigators and manuscript referees within the social
sciences receive special training in empirical research methods, relatively few law professors and
law review editors possess such training. See, e.g., Carl N. Edwards, In Search of Legal
Scholarship: Strategies for the Integration of Science into the Practice of Law, 8 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1998) ("Unfortunately, although interdisciplinary tools have been made
increasingly accessible to lawyers, the typical J.D. curriculum provides no preparation in the
skills needed to determine substantive facts beyond legal doctrine, nor in the scientific content
and analytic methods necessary to assess and support factual conclusions." (footnote omitted));
Goldsmith & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 166 ("[Rlecent years have seen an increasing (but still
small) number of empirically trained scholars enter the legal academy.").
79. Interestingly, neither the Journal of Legal Studies nor the recently-launched Journal of
Empirical Legal Studies expressly requires compliance with the replication norm. See JOURNAL
OF LEGAL STUDIES, Guidelines, at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS/guidel.html (last visited
Nov. 14, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUDIES, Author Guidelines, at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/submit.asp?ref=1740-1453
(last visited Nov. 14, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Both journals utilize
peer review, however, which likely ensures adequate disclosure of information about methods
and results in most of the empirical articles that these journals publish.
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disclosures within empirical legal scholarship fall short of some ideal mark
or that the level of actual disclosure in empirical legal research differs from
the level of actual disclosure in other fields within the social sciences.
Although Epstein and King present some suggestive evidence to support
the view that empirical legal scholarship fails to comply with the
replication norm,s° and some of my own work suggests that legal scholars
at times fail to disclose important information about their empirical
inquiries,"' the present Essay cannot answer the questions of how
widespread failures to comply with the replication norm may be or whether
the frequency of such failures exceeds that found in the social sciences
generally. In any event, it would make little sense to criticize legal scholars
for failing to meet some previously unspecified benchmark for disclosures
in empirical legal scholarship. Given the importance of disclosure to the
system of empirical research, however, it does make sense to argue that
aspirational benchmarks for disclosure should be established. Therefore, in
the following Part, I put forward a proposal designed to foster publicity and
transparency in empirical legal research without the need for peer review or
other potentially costly changes to the system of legal scholarship.
II. A PROPOSAL FOR INSTITUTIONALLY-IMPOSED DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS
Before explicating the proposed disclosure rules, a threshold question
must be addressed: what counts as empirical research to which these
disclosure rules should apply? Empirical research means different things to
different legal scholars, with the phrase often reserved for studies that
employ quantitative methods of some sort," but the basic point of
80. See Epstein & King, supra note 10, at 38 ("Good empirical work adheres to the
replication standard: another researcher should be able to understand, evaluate, build on, and
reproduce the research without any additional information from the author .... Unfortunately,
the present state of legal scholarship nearly always fails this most basic of tests."); id. at 131
(stating that the quantitative or qualitative data analyzed in empirical research within legal
scholarship is not typically stored, nor is the data readily accessible from the authors, law
reviews, or public sources, making it impossible to replicate the published studies).
81. See Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152 U.
PA. L. REv. 1517, 1578-79 & nn. 150-51 (2004) (discussing lack of disclosure with regard to how
evidence was selected to construct stories about the collapse of Enron Corporation).
82. See, e.g., Heise, New Empiricism, supra note 9, at 820-21 ("For purposes of this Article,
when I speak of empirical legal scholarship I refer only to the subset of empirical legal
scholarship that uses statistical techniques and analyses."); Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal
Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 347, 349 (1995) ("In other words, there has been a lack of empirical legal scholarship;
that is, scholarship based on a detailed statistical study and analysis from which one could draw
conclusions and formulate or reformulate policy." (footnotes omitted)); Peter H. Schuck, Why
Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 323 (1989)
(defining empirical research as "statistical studies, i.e., those that involve the application of
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separation between empirical and non-empirical research is the role that
observations play in the research: empirical research makes factual claims
about states of the world, particularly causal relationships within the world,
that are explicitly founded on direct observations of the world or inferences
from observations; non-empirical research does not pretend that its claims
about the world are founded on anything other than imagination,
supposition, or logic. 3 The particular purpose behind obtaining empirical
statistical techniques of inference to large bodies of data in an effort to detect important
regularities (or irregularities) that have not previously been identified or verified. Properly
understood, of course, empirical research embraces much more than statistical studies."); see also
Gene R. Shreve, Conflicts Empiricism, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 249, 251-53 (2001) (contrasting
"commonplace exercises of empiricism" with "scientific empiricism"); David M. Trubek, Where
the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575, 579-85 (1984)
(discussing different meanings attached to empiricism within legal scholarship).
83. The definition of empirical research offered here accords with the definition recently
offered by Korobkin. See Korobkin, supra note 20, at 1035 (defining empiricism as "any attempt
to collect and analyze a set of data for more than anecdotal purposes, whether or not the analysis
is quantitative and even if the data set is not a particularly systematic or a clearly representative
subset of the population in which the author is ultimately interested" (footnotes omitted)); see
also Shari Seidman Diamond, Empirical Marine Life in Legal Waters: Clams, Dolphins, and
Plankton, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 803, 804-07 (providing a similar description of empirical legal
research); Epstein & King, supra note 10, at 2-3 ("What makes research empirical is that it is
based on observations of the world-in other words data, which is just a term for facts about the
world."); cf JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE 21 (1993) (defining empirical legal research as encompassing "what Charles E. Clark
called 'fact' or 'field,' as distinguished from 'library,' research. Such research was usually, but
not exclusively, seen as research into present social, economic, or legal conditions or practices
and as attempting to quantify relationships, though not to require hypothesis formulation and
testing.").
I do not include introspection as one of the sources of claims found in non-empirical
research because there is serious dispute about the proper role of introspection in empirical
psychological research (i.e., to what extent can introspection be a valid form of observation or
data for social scientific purposes?). Compare Goldman, supra note 24, at 544 ("I see no reason
to abandon the current cognitive science practice of relying on introspection (with all due
caution). In particular, neither the traditional publicity thesis nor the fall-back publicity thesis
provides grounds for requiring cognitive scientists to abandon their reliance on introspection."),
with Daniel C. Dennett, Who's On First? Heterophenomenology Explained, 10 J.
CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 19, 23 (2003) ("[Slcientists have always recognized the need to confirm
the insights they have gained from introspection by conducting properly controlled experiments
with naive subjects. As long as this obligation is met, whatever insights one may gamer from
'first-person' investigations fall happily into place in 'third-person' heterophenomenology.").
Further, note that many non-empirical works of legal scholarship proceed from
important empirical assumptions. Although the arguments in these non-empirical works may
depend importantly on these empirical assumptions, it is the presentation of arguments premised
on empirical assumptions, rather than the presentation of original empirical research meant to
give rise to or alter empirical assumptions, that is the centerpiece of non-empirical scholarship.
Of course, many works of legal scholarship will make both empirical claims and non-empirical
arguments. To the extent the empirical claims supposedly represent the findings of original
empirical research, the essay would fall within the parameters of the proposal advanced here.
The most difficult works to classify are papers where "soft" empirical claims are used to
support an argument, but where advancement of the empirical claims is not the main thrust of the
paper. For example, arguably the present Essay falls into this hard-to-classify category, because
[Vol. 83
EMPIRICAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
data will vary with the research project, but the aim of the empirical
research will generally be description ("Who won the 2000 presidential
election?"), explanation ("Why did Bush prevail over Gore in the 2000
presidential election?"), or prediction ("Who will win the next presidential
election?").84
The primary concern here is with the original reports of empirical
research, by which I mean scholarly works that report for the first time
factual observations about the world obtained through some deliberate
data-gathering or data-analysis process carried out by the authors of the
research report for the purpose of making fact-based claims. The factual
observations may take a variety of forms, from relatively unmediated
descriptions of phenomena and summary descriptions of collections of
phenomena to inferences about causal relations or the characteristics of a
population. The data may be gathered using experimental or non-
experimental techniques, and the inferences and conclusions drawn from
the data may be based on quantitative or qualitative data analysis
techniques. Thus, empirical research as defined here encompasses the first
published reports of results from laboratory and field experiments, survey
research, interviews, passive observational research, case studies, and
historical and other archival research.85
Original reports of empirical research, as opposed to secondary works
drawing on the original report, constitute the primary concern because the
original report is typically intended to be the main vehicle whereby factual
it contains observations about the disclosure norms within social scientific and legal research.
Accordingly, the sources of these observations are disclosed.
84. Explanation and prediction typically receive greater prominence than description in
discussions of the aims of empirical research. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 3 (1989) ("The social sciences, like other empirical sciences, try to explain two
sorts of phenomena: events and facts .... To explain an event is to give an account of why it
happened." (footnote omitted)); JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW
48 (4th ed. 1998) (identifying three generic goals of social scientists using the empirical
approach: "they wish to predict when the event being studied will occur; they wish to have the
ability to control whether the event occurs; and they wish to understand what causes the event to
occur").
85. Four general methodologies may be employed in empirical legal research: experiments
and simulations, survey and interview research, field studies or observational studies, and
nonreactive studies. See JOHN BREWER & ALBERT HUNTER, MULTIMETHOD RESEARCH: A
SYNTHESIS OF STYLES 13-14 (1989). Nonreactive research includes "unobtrusive observational
techniques" and the study of "artifacts, archives, official statistics, and other natural byproducts of
past social life." Id. at 14. Diamond offers examples of a variety of different empirical research
methods. See Diamond, supra note 83, at 806-07 (discussing case studies, quantitative archival
research, interview research, laboratory experiments, observational studies, and field
experiments); see also Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in
Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1126 (2002) ("Empirical research designs
encompass experimental research, quasi-experimental research, observational studies, and case
studies. Research methods include surveys and focus groups. Empirical research can take place
in the field, in a laboratory, or even in a library setting.").
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observations are made available for public consumption in a
comprehensible and comprehensive fashion.86 In other words, the original
research report should convey the information needed by those who may
rely on the researcher's factual observations and the inferences drawn from
these observations or who may seek to test the validity or generality of
these observations or inferences.
With respect to the particular information that should be contained in
an original research report, one approach would be simply to incorporate
the general replication norm of disclosure into The Bluebook or law review
submission guidelines. However, because we cannot rely on law professor
authors and law review editors to discern what specific disclosures should
be included to meet the replication norm, a better approach is to specify a
set of well-defined, easily-implemented, mandatory rules to guide
disclosure in empirical legal research reports. Such disclosure rules, which
ideally would be incorporated into The Bluebook for the benefit of both
authors and editors, should clearly specify the information that must be
disclosed as a condition of publication of empirical research in a law
review so that authors and editors without special training in empirical
research can comply with the rules.
This second approach mirrors the approach taken by the APA with
respect to disclosure in reports of psychological research, and in fact the
APA Publication Manual provides excellent guidance on what the
disclosure rules for empirical legal scholarship should look like. 7 In
addition, guidelines for conducting meta-analysis indicate the information
that should be disclosed in individual studies to ensure the greatest
86. Indeed, as Ziman notes, the research report is of at least equal importance to the
underlying research and is a crucial step in the scientific process:
A major consequence of my present thesis about the nature of Science is that the
"literature" of a subject is quite as important as the research work that it embodies. An
investigation is by no means completed when the last pointer reading has been noted
down, the last computation printed out and agreement between theory and experiment
confirmed to the umpteenth decimal place. The form in which it is presented to the
scientific community, the "paper" in which it is first reported, the subsequent criticisms
and citations from other authors and the eventual place that it occupies in the minds of a
subsequent generation-these are all quite as much part of its life as the germ of the idea
from which it originated or the carefully designed apparatus in which hypothesis was
tested and found to be good. To describe scientific research work only up to the moment
when each paper is published is like attempting to describe a human community by
depicting the life of each individual up to the age of puberty, without reference to those
years of maturity and responsibility that follow. A progenitor of a scientific paper is like
a parent, whose early influence is decisive in the character of the child, but who cannot
determine the career of his offspring in the adult world.
J.M. ZIMAN, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF
SCIENCE 103 (1968).
87. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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collective use of data subsequent to initial publication.88 Together these
sources suggest the following mandatory disclosure rules for reports of
original empirical legal research:
(1) In the introductory sections of the paper, the author shall disclose
the primary purpose of the empirical investigation that was
undertaken, including a statement of the problem to be studied, the
phenomena to be described, and/or specific hypotheses or theoretical
propositions to be tested. The study should be situated within the
larger body of empirical inquiry into the same or related phenomena.
The introduction should provide an overview of the research plan
utilized to study the particular question at issue and should explain
how the research plan logically relates to the empirical question to be
answered.
(2) In a section entitled "Method," the author shall disclose sufficient
information to allow another investigator to evaluate one's methods
and verify one's results, including disclosure of the following
information: 89
(a) The basic research design employed and a description of all
variables studied.
(b) A description of the sample of observations obtained. This
description should include a statement of the overall sample size
(N) and subsample sizes (n's) if the observations are broken
down into subgroups (e.g., numbers of participants in each
experimental condition). The procedure for collecting
observations should be disclosed, including the use of any data
sampling techniques and the identity of any archives used in the
research. Relevant distinguishing characteristics of different
data sources should also be disclosed. For example, if human
participants serve as the source of data, major demographic
characteristics of the participants should be reported, and any
additional distinguishing characteristics that may be relevant to
the investigation should be disclosed. Describe the time period
during which observations were obtained from survey,
experimental, and/or field research. Finally, describe any data
sources that did not provide complete data or that had to be
eliminated after initiation of the study and explain why complete
data could not be obtained (e.g., if respondents refused to
88. See supra note 57. 
0
89. A good rule to keep in mind for this section is that offered by the APA's Publication
Manual: "Remember that the Methods section should tell the reader what you did and how you
did it in sufficient detail so that a reader could reasonably replicate your study." APA
PUBLICATION MANUAL, supra note 60, at 14-15.
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answer particular survey questions, disclose the particular
questions at issue and the number of respondents refusing to
answer).
(c) A description of any apparatuses, instruments, or other
tangible materials employed in the study. The specifications of
any special devices, instruments, or questionnaires utilized in the
study should be provided. Relevant portions of any written
materials should be reproduced in an appendix to the research
report.
(d) A step-by-step description of the procedure employed in
execution of the research. This description should include
instructions to participants in the study, detailed information
about specific experimental manipulations, and detailed
information about any coding decisions required to quantify
observations for statistical analysis purposes. Disclose the
identity of persons who obtained the data and whether they were
blind to the purposes of the study. With respect to any data
coding involved in the study, disclose the number and identity of
data coders, whether they were blind to the purposes of the
study, and a measure of inter-rater reliability. Finally, include
information about any randomization or other control
procedures used in the study, as well as any deception that was
necessary for purposes of the study.
(3) In a section entitled "Results," the author shall describe the data
collected and the results of statistical analyses conducted on the data,
including the following information:
(a) Report descriptive statistics as appropriate, including
measures of central tendency and associated measures of
variability.
(b) Report inferential statistics as appropriate, including
information about the magnitude or value of the inferential test,
the associated degrees of freedom, the probability level for the
reported statistics, the direction of the effect, and a measure of
effect size.
(c) Briefly relate the particular descriptive and inferential
statistics to the questions that motivated the study as discussed
in the introduction.
(d) Describe in detail any missing data or data that could not be
used for statistical analysis ptuposes.
(4) In the concluding sections of the paper, the author should relate
the empirical findings to the original purpose of the study as
discussed in the introduction, including a clear statement of the
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rejection or acceptance of any empirical hypotheses after testing, and
the author should discuss limitations on the validity and
generalizability of the empirical findings.
The first three rules above address the basic information that should be
disclosed for replication and meta-analytic purposes, and the fourth rule is
designed to reduce improper extrapolations from an empirical study. The
following additional rules address non-essential information for replication
purposes but seek information that may otherwise be important to the
research process or to enforcement of the replication norm:
(5) In the initial footnote of the paper, the author shall provide
information on how interested persons may contact the author for
additional information about the study. For a multiple author work,
the primary contact person for informational inquiries shall be
designated. If data from the study have been made available in a
public archive, then readers should be informed as to how to access
the data. It shall be presumed that the author's data, data coding
materials, and data analysis results (redacted as necessary to preserve
the privacy interests of data sources) are available for review and use
by others unless the author expressly indicates otherwise in the
initial footnote. Data should be made freely available to other
investigators absent legal restrictions on sharing of the data.90
(6) In the initial footnote, the author shall disclose any sources that
provided funding for the empirical investigation, institutional
affiliations of the author, and any other information that may be
perceived as creating a potential conflict of interest.9'
90. The approach to data archiving is hortatory rather than mandatory and mirrors the
approach taken by the American Political Science Association. See STYLE MANUAL FOR
POLITICAL SCIENCE, supra note 29, at 44-45. The fear is that a mandatory data-archiving policy
at this stage in the development of empirical legal scholarship might be seen as too costly to
authors and editors and thus might discourage the conduct or publication of empirical legal
research.
Note that the data-sharing directive applies with equal force to quantitative and
qualitative studies. See generally Miriam A. Golden, Replication and Non-Quantitative
Research, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 481 (1995) (arguing that the replication standard imposed on
quantitative work should be extended to qualitative work as well because the believability of both
types of studies is equally important).
91. A basic justification for disclosure of potential conflicts of interests is that it may
increase scrutiny of research and reveal the influence of bias. See, e.g., David B. Resnik,
Conflicts of Interest in Science, 6 PERSP. ON Sci. 381, 396 (1998) ("Disclosure can play a key
role in promoting objectivity in research: if a scientist discloses a conflict of interest, his peers
may have some reasons to be skeptical of his research and subject it to more careful scrutiny.").
However, if full disclosure is made pursuant to the first four rules set out above, then the
scientific community should have sufficient information to critically evaluate a study and its
claims. In such a case, the disclosure of conflicts information adds nothing of particular scientific
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(7) If the research involved human or animal subjects, the researcher
must certify in the initial footnote to the paper or that data was
collected in accordance with the ethical principles of the American
Psychological Association or in compliance with the rules and
regulations of the institutional review board at the researcher's
affiliated institution.92
In interpreting these rules, authors and law review editors should look
to the APA Publication Manual for detailed guidance on how to make
proper disclosures. These rules offer a first attempt at developing a system
of publication that encourages full disclosure in empirical legal scholarship,
and the hope is that these rules will serve as a platform for discussion about
whether full disclosure in empirical legal scholarship is desirable and, if so,
what rules should be put in place to best achieve this goal.
CONCLUSION
Both the demand for, and supply of, empirical legal research seem to
be on the rise. The increased interest in empirical legal research presents a
wonderful opportunity to develop new and reliable knowledge about a host
of legal phenomena to inform legal policy and enrich legal theory, but
success in this regard depends importantly on the manner in which the
research is made public. If full advantage is to be taken of the critical
dialogue among researchers that leads to reliable knowledge, then the
methods and results underlying empirical claims must be made public in
detailed, reproducible terms. This Essay proposes one set of rules that
might be applied by law reviews to achieve this end. The proposed rules
should be capable of easy application by law review editors with the
assistance of researchers, and the information to be disclosed under these
rules should be at the ready disposal of researchers. Adherence to such
rules might well make empirical legal scholarship a more respected and
valuable voice in social scientific dialogue at little or no cost.
value and may in fact lead to distrust in a study for the wrong reasons, namely, via a belief that
the researcher was influenced by powerful interests regardless of whether the researcher
employed sound methods. Nevertheless, imposing a disclosure duty with respect to potential
conflicts of interest may serve a disciplining effect on researchers and lead to greater care in
anticipation of greater scrutiny of the empirical claims.
92. For the APA's ethical standards, see American Psychological Association, Ethical
Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, 57 AM. PSYCHOL. 1060 passim (2002).
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